Justia Trademark Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between two companies, 1-800 Contacts, Inc. (Plaintiff-Appellant) and JAND, Inc., doing business as Warby Parker (Defendant-Appellee). 1-800 Contacts alleged that Warby Parker used its trademarks in keyword search advertisements, violating the federal Lanham Act and New York State common law. Specifically, 1-800 Contacts claimed that Warby Parker purchased keywords consisting of 1-800 Contacts' trademarks to divert customers searching for 1-800 Contacts to Warby Parker's website. However, 1-800 Contacts did not allege that Warby Parker used its trademarks in any other way beyond purchasing them as keywords.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted Warby Parker's motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissing the case. The district court applied the Polaroid test to determine the likelihood of consumer confusion and found that although 1-800 Contacts' trademarks were strong and there were indications of bad faith by Warby Parker, these factors were insufficient to establish a likelihood of consumer confusion. The court emphasized that Warby Parker's advertisements and landing pages clearly displayed Warby Parker's own mark, which was substantially different from 1-800 Contacts' marks.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the mere act of purchasing a competitor's trademarks as keywords does not constitute trademark infringement. It found that 1-800 Contacts failed to plausibly allege any likelihood of consumer confusion under the Polaroid test. The court noted that Warby Parker's advertisements and landing pages did not use 1-800 Contacts' trademarks and were clearly marked with Warby Parker's own branding, making it unlikely that consumers would be confused about the source or affiliation of the advertisements. View "1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. JAND, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the "Pollo Picú" trademark used in the sale of fresh chicken. Productos Avícolas del Sur, Inc. (PAS) sold chicken under this trademark until 2011, when financial difficulties forced the company to stop. In 2016, To-Ricos, Ltd. (To-Ricos) applied to register the Picú mark, believing PAS had abandoned it. PAS opposed the application, leading To-Ricos to seek a declaratory judgment in federal district court to establish its ownership of the mark. The district court granted summary judgment for To-Ricos, concluding that PAS had abandoned the mark.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico found that PAS had not used the Picú mark for at least three consecutive years, establishing a prima facie case of abandonment. PAS argued that its financial difficulties and ongoing litigation with its bank excused its nonuse of the mark and that it intended to resume use. However, the district court determined that PAS did not provide sufficient evidence of intent to resume use within the statutory period and thus granted summary judgment in favor of To-Ricos.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that PAS failed to rebut the presumption of abandonment. PAS's attempts to sell the mark in 2012, its 2014 settlement agreement with the bank, and its 2017 licensing agreement with IMEX did not demonstrate an intent to resume use of the mark within the relevant statutory period. The court emphasized that mere explanations for nonuse or vague intentions to resume use are insufficient to rebut the presumption of abandonment. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, establishing To-Ricos as the rightful owner of the Picú mark. View "To-Ricos, Ltd. v. Productos Avicolas del Sur, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2020, Mix Creative Learning Center, an art studio offering children's art lessons, began selling online art kits during the pandemic. These kits included reproductions of artworks from Michel Keck's Dog Art series. Keck sued Mix Creative and its proprietor for copyright and trademark infringement, seeking enhanced statutory damages for willful infringement.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas found that the fair use defense applied to the copyright claim and granted summary judgment to Mix Creative. The court also granted summary judgment on the trademark claim, even though Mix Creative had not sought it. Following this, the district court awarded fees and costs to Mix Creative under 17 U.S.C. § 505 but declined to hold Keck’s trial counsel jointly and severally liable for the fee award under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the fair use defense applied because Mix Creative’s use was transformative and unlikely to harm the market for Keck’s works. The court also found that any error in the district court’s sua sponte grant of summary judgment on the trademark claim was harmless, given the parties' concession that the arguments for the copyright claim applied to the trademark claim. Lastly, the appellate court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees to Mix Creative or in refusing to hold Keck’s attorneys jointly and severally liable for the fee award. View "Keck v. Mix Creative Learning Center" on Justia Law

American Girl, LLC, a manufacturer of dolls and related products, sued Zembrka, a Chinese entity operating through websites, for selling counterfeit American Girl products. American Girl alleged that Zembrka's websites sold and shipped counterfeit products to New York, using American Girl's trademarks. The case was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.The District Court granted Zembrka's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, emphasizing that American Girl failed to show that Zembrka shipped the counterfeit products to New York. The court concluded that without evidence of shipment, the "transacting business" requirement under New York's long-arm statute, C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), was not met. American Girl's motion for reconsideration, which included new evidence of New York customers purchasing counterfeit products, was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that American Girl had adequately demonstrated that Zembrka transacted business in New York. Evidence showed that Zembrka accepted orders from New York, sent order confirmations, and received payments, which constituted purposeful activity within the state. The court held that actual shipment of goods was not necessary to establish personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1). The court also determined that exercising jurisdiction over Zembrka was consistent with due process, given New York's strong interest in protecting its consumers and businesses from counterfeit goods.The Second Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "American Girl, LLC v. Zembrka" on Justia Law

A physician in Puerto Rico, Dr. Jaime Salas Rushford, had his board certification suspended by the American Board of Internal Medicine (ABIM) after ABIM concluded that he had improperly shared board exam questions with his test prep instructor. ABIM sued Salas Rushford for copyright infringement in New Jersey. Salas Rushford counterclaimed against ABIM and several ABIM-affiliated individuals, alleging that the process leading to his suspension was a "sham."The counterclaims were transferred to the District of Puerto Rico, where the district court granted ABIM's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied Salas Rushford leave to amend his pleading. The court found that Salas Rushford failed to state a claim for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and tort claims against the ABIM Individuals. The court also dismissed his Lanham Act claim for commercial disparagement.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Salas Rushford's claims. It held that ABIM had broad discretion under its policies to revoke certification if a diplomate failed to maintain satisfactory ethical and professional behavior. The court found that Salas Rushford did not plausibly allege that ABIM acted with bad motive or ill intention, which is necessary to state a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under New Jersey law.The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Lanham Act claim, noting that Salas Rushford failed to allege actual consumer deception or intentional deception, which is required to state a claim for false advertising. Finally, the court upheld the district court's denial of leave to amend the complaint, citing undue delay and lack of a concrete argument for why justice required an amendment. View "American Board of Internal Medicine v. Salas-Rushford" on Justia Law

In 2022, two top officers of the Libertarian Party of Michigan resigned, leading to a power struggle within the party. Andrew Chadderdon became the acting Chair, but his leadership was contested by the defendants, who then voted to remove him and elected themselves to committee positions. The Libertarian Party Judicial Committee later voided these elections, reinstating Chadderdon. The defendants, however, continued to use the Libertarian National Committee’s (LNC) trademark, claiming to be the rightful leaders of the Michigan affiliate.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted the LNC’s request for a preliminary injunction, barring the defendants from using the LNC’s trademark. The defendants appealed, arguing that the district court’s application of the Lanham Act to their noncommercial speech violated the First Amendment and that their use of the trademark was authorized and not likely to cause confusion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Lanham Act could apply to the defendants’ use of the LNC’s trademark because they used it as a source identifier for their political services, which falls within the scope of the Act. The court also determined that the defendants’ use of the trademark created a likelihood of confusion among potential voters, party members, and donors. However, the court found that the defendants’ use of the trademark for online solicitation, when accompanied by clear disclaimers, did not create a likelihood of confusion.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction in part, except for the aspect concerning the defendants’ online solicitation with disclaimers, which it vacated. View "Libertarian National Committee, Inc. v. Saliba" on Justia Law

Simply Wireless, Inc., a Virginia telecommunications company, sued T-Mobile US, Inc. and T-Mobile USA, Inc. for trademark infringement, alleging that T-Mobile had infringed on its common law trademark "SIMPLY PREPAID." Simply Wireless had used the trademark from 2002 to 2008 and resumed its use in 2012. T-Mobile began using the same trademark in 2014 and applied to register it with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Simply Wireless filed a competing application and subsequently launched a revamped website under the trademark.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment to T-Mobile, ruling that Simply Wireless had abandoned the trademark due to nonuse from 2009 to 2011. The court found that Simply Wireless had not provided sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of abandonment, which is triggered by three consecutive years of nonuse under 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Simply Wireless appealed, arguing that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding its intent to resume use of the trademark during the period of nonuse.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and vacated the district court's summary judgment order. The appellate court found that Simply Wireless had presented sufficient evidence, including a detailed declaration from its CEO and corroborating documents, to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding its intent to resume use of the trademark during the period of nonuse. The court emphasized that the intent-to-resume-use inquiry is an intensely factual question and rarely amenable to summary judgment. The Fourth Circuit also rejected T-Mobile's alternative argument that the statutory abandonment test does not apply to common law trademarks, affirming that the test is applicable.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Simply Wireless, Inc v. T-Mobile US, Inc" on Justia Law

Bruce Molzan, a well-known chef, filed a lawsuit against Bellagreen Holdings, LLC, and other associated entities and individuals, alleging trademark infringement and other claims under the Lanham Act and Texas law. Molzan claimed that he had been using the "RUGGLES" trademarks for over forty years and that the defendants misused these trademarks after a forced sale of his restaurants. He alleged that the defendants continued to use the "RUGGLES GREEN" trademark and domain name without authorization, causing consumer confusion.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed all of Molzan's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court found that Molzan's allegations were conclusory and did not establish a connection between the defendants and the third-party websites causing the confusion. The court also determined that the Settlement Agreement between the parties addressed the alleged infringements and provided a remedy for such transgressions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that Molzan's complaint contained well-pleaded factual allegations that made his claims facially plausible. The court noted that the allegations established a likelihood of confusion due to the defendants' continued use of the "RUGGLES" trademarks. The court also found that the district court erred in assuming the veracity of the defendants' assertions over Molzan's well-pleaded allegations. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Molzan's federal and state trademark infringement, false advertising, unfair competition, and state trademark dilution claims. The court also reversed the dismissal of Molzan's breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. Additionally, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of the Web Defendants and the denial of Molzan's motion for leave to amend his complaint. View "Molzan v. Bellagreen Holdings" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Marco Destin, Inc., 1000 Highway 98 East Corp., E&T, Inc., and Panama Surf & Sport, Inc. (collectively, “Marco Destin”) filed a lawsuit against agents of L&L Wings, Inc. (“L&L”), alleging that a 2011 stipulated judgment in a trademark action was obtained through fraud. Marco Destin claimed that L&L had fraudulently procured a trademark registration from the USPTO, which was used to secure the judgment. They sought to vacate the 2011 judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3) and requested sanctions and damages.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. The court found that Marco Destin had a reasonable opportunity to uncover the alleged fraud during the initial litigation. Specifically, the court noted that the License Agreement between the parties indicated that other entities might have paramount rights to the "Wings" trademark, suggesting that Marco Destin could have discovered the fraud with due diligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal for abuse of discretion. The appellate court confirmed that the district court acted within its discretion in declining to vacate the 2011 stipulated judgment. The court emphasized that Marco Destin had a reasonable opportunity to uncover the alleged fraud during the initial litigation and that equitable relief under Rule 60(d)(3) requires a showing of due diligence. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion that Marco Destin could have discovered the fraud through proper diligence.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding the dismissal of Marco Destin’s claims. View "Marco Destin, Inc. v. Levy" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a trademark application for "COLOGNE & COGNAC ENTERTAINMENT" by a hip-hop record label. The appellants, Bureau National Interprofessionnel du Cognac and Institut National des Appellations d’Origine, are responsible for controlling and protecting the certification mark "COGNAC" for brandy from the Cognac region of France. They opposed the trademark application, arguing that it would likely cause confusion and dilute their certification mark.The United States Patent and Trademark Office's Trademark Trial and Appeal Board dismissed the opposition. The Board found that the "COLOGNE & COGNAC ENTERTAINMENT" mark, when used for hip-hop music and production services, was not likely to cause confusion or dilute the "COGNAC" certification mark. The Board concluded that the marks were dissimilar in connotation and commercial impression, and that the relevant goods, services, trade channels, and purchasers did not overlap. The Board also found that the appellants had not proven the fame of the "COGNAC" mark for purposes of dilution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the Board's decision. The court found that the Board applied an incorrect legal standard for determining the fame of the "COGNAC" mark and improperly discounted relevant evidence. The court also found that the Board erred in its analysis of the similarity of the marks and the relatedness of the goods, services, and trade channels. Additionally, the court concluded that the appellants had sufficiently pleaded their dilution claim. The case was remanded for reconsideration of the likelihood of confusion and dilution issues. View "BUREAU NATIONAL INTERPROFESSIONNEL DU COGNAC v. COLOGNE & COGNAC ENTERTAINMENT" on Justia Law