Justia Trademark Opinion Summaries

Two organizations involved in competitive cheerleading became embroiled in a dispute over the use of two marks: “THE CHEERLEADING WORLDS,” which is registered on the Supplemental Register with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and “WORLDS,” which is claimed as an unregistered common law mark. The plaintiff, a governing body for competitive cheerleading, has held an annual event under these marks since 2004. The defendants, including a group of former members of the plaintiff organization, began hosting a similarly named event in the same region, allegedly causing confusion among participants and the public.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that both marks were generic as a matter of law and thus not entitled to trademark protection. The court found that the terms described the basic nature of the plaintiff’s services and discounted evidence showing non-generic use, reasoning that the plaintiff’s event had long been the only one of its kind. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the defendants were barred from contesting the marks’ distinctiveness due to an earlier dismissal of an affirmative defense with prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the issue of distinctiveness was properly before the district court, as distinctiveness is an element of the plaintiff’s claim and not an affirmative defense. The Eleventh Circuit found that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to whether the marks were descriptive or had acquired secondary meaning, based on evidence of public association with the plaintiff’s event. The court remanded the case for trial, holding that summary judgment was inappropriate because a reasonable jury could find the marks protectable. The court also declined to decide issues of likelihood of confusion and individual liability without factual findings. View "U.S. All Star Federation, Inc. v. Open Cheer & Dance Championship Series, LLC" on Justia Law

A Chinese citizen was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2007. In 2012, New Jersey charged him with trademark counterfeiting. While awaiting trial, he traveled temporarily to China. Upon his return to the U.S., a border officer, aware of his pending criminal charge, declined to treat him as already admitted and instead paroled him into the country pending the outcome of his case. After he pleaded guilty to the state charge in 2013, the government initiated removal proceedings, charging him as an applicant for admission who was inadmissible because of his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude.An Immigration Judge found him removable on these grounds, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The respondent sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. That court vacated the removal order, holding that unless border officers had “clear and convincing” evidence at the time of entry that the lawful permanent resident had committed the crime, the individual must be treated as already admitted. The Second Circuit concluded that the pending criminal charge did not constitute clear and convincing evidence, so the individual should not have been paroled but deemed admitted, and thus could not be removed on inadmissibility grounds.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and vacated the Second Circuit’s judgment. The Court held that the Immigration and Nationality Act does not require border officers to have clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident has committed a crime involving moral turpitude before treating the resident as an applicant for admission. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings, without deciding whether the underlying crime involved moral turpitude. View "Blanche v. Lau" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the HAVANA CLUB trademark, originally registered in the United States in 1976 by a Cuban state-owned company, Cubaexport. Due to changes in U.S. law, renewal of the trademark registration required a specific license from the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) after 1998. In December 2005, Cubaexport submitted its renewal application and payment to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) without the required OFAC license. OFAC later notified the PTO that the payment was unauthorized, leading to the PTO’s refund of the fee and refusal to renew the registration. Cubaexport unsuccessfully litigated against OFAC and, in 2015, reapplied for the license, which OFAC granted retroactively in 2016, authorizing the 2005 payment.After the PTO Director accepted Cubaexport’s renewal filing based on the retroactive OFAC license, Bacardi sued the PTO and its Director in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Bacardi argued the PTO lacked statutory authority to renew the expired registration and acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The district court initially dismissed the case, finding judicial review precluded by the Lanham Act, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. On remand, Cubaexport intervened, and after cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted judgment for the defendants, finding the OFAC license validated the payment and that any deficiency was cured during the petition process.Reviewing the district court’s summary judgment de novo, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the PTO Director acted within statutory authority, as the retroactive OFAC license validated the 2005 payment, satisfying the renewal requirements. The court also held the Director’s explanation for the renewal was reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Bacardi and Company Limited v. Squires" on Justia Law

Two businesses and their principals were involved in the sale of a cigar company. The sale was governed by a written agreement which expressly reserved three registered trademarks for the sellers, and did not mention other closely related marks. After the sale, the buyers’ company launched new cigar products and marketing campaigns referencing the history and reputation of the reserved marks and associated product lines. The sellers objected, claiming infringement of their reserved trademark interests and associated goodwill. When attempts to resolve the dispute failed, the sellers filed a federal trademark infringement lawsuit.The first lawsuit was brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. That court did not address the merits of the trademark claims. Instead, it found that the claims arose out of the sales agreement, which contained a forum selection clause requiring venue in state court in Lawrence County, South Dakota. On that basis, the Florida district court dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds. Subsequently, the buyers initiated a related contract lawsuit in South Dakota state court. The sellers then filed the present lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota, asserting only federal Lanham Act claims and omitting the sales agreement from their initial filings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the federal trademark claims arose out of the sales agreement, because resolving them would require analyzing the parties’ contractual allocation of trademark rights and goodwill. The court further held that the forum selection clause in the agreement was valid, mandatory, and enforceable under South Dakota law and federal law, and that it required litigation to proceed in state court in Lawrence County, South Dakota. The Eighth Circuit also concluded that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over federal Lanham Act claims. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Vaughn Boyd v. Deadwood Tobacco Co." on Justia Law

A clothing company filed a lawsuit against multiple e-commerce vendors, including a Chinese company, alleging trademark infringement, counterfeiting, unfair competition, and related claims under the Lanham Act. The defendants were identified in a document attached to the complaint. Because the defendants were primarily Chinese entities operating online, the plaintiff asserted it was difficult to determine their exact identities and addresses. The plaintiff sought and was granted permission by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to serve the defendants by email, which included sending a link to the complaint and other documents. The defendant, Hangzhou, engaged in settlement discussions but did not appear in court, leading to a default judgment. The court’s order also allowed the plaintiff to collect funds from third parties, including from Hangzhou’s Amazon account.After the plaintiff collected a portion of the judgment, Hangzhou appeared and moved to vacate the default judgment, primarily arguing that service by email in China was prohibited under the Hague Service Convention and thus the judgment was void for lack of proper service. The district court denied this motion, concluding that the Convention permits email service in China, and rejected other arguments related to Illinois post-judgment procedures.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that the Hague Service Convention prohibits service by email in China, contrary to the district court’s conclusion. However, the appellate court determined that the district court must first decide whether the Convention applies to this case, specifically whether the defendant’s address was “not known,” which would render the Convention inapplicable. The Seventh Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s decision denying the motion to vacate the default judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve this threshold issue. View "Kangol LLC v Hangzhou Chuanyue Silk Import & Export Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

Trojan Battery, a well-established manufacturer of golf cart batteries with valuable trademark rights in the “TROJAN” name and related marks, sued Golf Carts of Cypress and Trojan EV. The defendants, owned by the same individual, began selling golf carts under the “TROJAN-EV” brand, which led to alleged confusion among dealers and customers about the origin or affiliation of the products. Trojan Battery sent a cease-and-desist letter, but the defendants continued their use of the TROJAN-EV mark. The evidence showed that both companies operated within the golf industry, used similar advertising channels, and targeted the same customer base.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held a bench trial. The district court found the defendants liable for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act and Texas law, based on a likelihood of confusion between the marks. The court awarded Trojan Battery the defendants’ profits as a remedy and issued a permanent injunction against further infringement. The district court also rejected the defendants’ post-trial motions and denied their request to amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law. Defendants appealed these rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s liability judgment and the award of profits, finding no clear error in the determination that there was a likelihood of confusion and that disgorgement of profits was warranted. However, the appellate court vacated the permanent injunction, holding that it was overbroad because it extended beyond the golf cart and battery markets, where confusion was likely, to unrelated products and markets. The case was remanded for the district court to narrow the scope of the injunction. View "Trojan Battery v. Golf Carts of Cypress" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the rights to the name, image, and trademarks associated with the late artist Frida Kahlo. Two Panamanian corporations with principal places of business in Florida, Frida Kahlo Corporation and Frida Kahlo Investments, manage and license numerous Frida Kahlo trademarks. Mara Cristina Teresa Romeo Pinedo, Frida Kahlo’s grandniece and a resident of Mexico, is an owner and former officer of Familia Kahlo S.A. de C.V., a Mexican company. The parties’ relationship became contentious, leading to litigation in several countries over the intellectual property rights. Plaintiffs alleged that, beginning in 2017 and specifically targeting Florida in 2021 and 2022, the defendants sent cease-and-desist letters to plaintiffs’ business partners in Florida, threatening legal action based on what plaintiffs contend were false claims to trademark ownership. Plaintiffs claimed these actions constituted tortious interference under Florida law and the Lanham Act.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found that Florida’s long-arm statute was satisfied for Familia Kahlo, but the corporate shield doctrine protected Pinedo because she was not acting in her personal capacity. The court further concluded that the minimum contacts required by due process were not established for either defendant, as sending cease-and-desist letters alone was insufficient.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. The Eleventh Circuit held that the corporate shield doctrine did not apply to Pinedo because the cease-and-desist letters were sent on her behalf in her personal capacity. The court also held that due process permitted the exercise of personal jurisdiction over both defendants, as the “effects test” was satisfied and a tortious cease-and-desist letter can meet the minimum contacts requirement. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Frida Kahlo Corporation v. Pinedo" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including a medical device company and its founder, developed and sold a cosmetic penile implant. In 2018, a urologist who later became one of the defendants attended a training session hosted by the plaintiffs, where he signed a non-disclosure agreement and was introduced to certain ideas for improving the implant as well as a list of required surgical instruments. Plaintiffs claimed that these ideas and the instrument list were trade secrets. Soon after, the defendants began developing a competing implant, filed patent applications based on allegedly misappropriated information, and advertised using plaintiffs’ trademark.The United States District Court for the Central District of California heard the case, which included claims for trade secret misappropriation, breach of contract under the nondisclosure agreement, trademark counterfeiting, and incorrect inventorship of two patents. The jury found for the plaintiffs on all major claims, including that the asserted trade secrets were protectable and misappropriated, and that there had been a breach of contract. The court awarded substantial damages, including a reasonable royalty, exemplary damages, and a permanent injunction preventing the defendants from using the trade secrets. The court also found for plaintiffs on their counterfeiting claim and invalidated the two patents for failure to name an alleged true inventor.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held there was not legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the asserted information qualified as trade secrets under California law, as the core concepts were either generally known or not subject to reasonable secrecy efforts. The court reversed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the trade secret and breach-of-contract claims, vacated the damages and injunction based on them, and reversed the invalidation of the patents. However, the court affirmed the verdict and damages for trademark counterfeiting. The result was an affirmance in part, reversal in part, and vacatur in part. View "INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL DEVICES, INC. v. CORNELL " on Justia Law

Fuente Marketing Ltd., a family-owned company selling premium hand-rolled cigars, owns two registered standard character trademarks for the letter X in connection with cigars and related products. Vaporous Technologies, LLC, designs and manufactures oral vaporizers and sought to register a mark featuring an abstract stick figure composed of intersecting lines forming a stylized X and a shaded circle above it, for use with various smoking-related goods. Fuente opposed this trademark application, alleging a likelihood of confusion with its own X marks.The United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), reviewed the opposition. The parties stipulated certain facts, including a description of Vaporous’s mark. The TTAB applied the In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. factors, finding that while the goods and trade channels overlapped and thus favored a likelihood of confusion, the dissimilarity of the marks weighed heavily against it. The Board found Fuente’s X marks conceptually strong but commercially weak and determined the relevant DuPont factors were either neutral or favored confusion, except for the critical mark similarity factor. Ultimately, the TTAB concluded that the marks were sufficiently distinct in commercial impression, appearance, and sound to avoid confusion and dismissed Fuente’s opposition.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s factual findings for substantial evidence and its legal conclusions de novo. The Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision, holding that the dissimilarity between the marks was sufficient, even in light of other factors, to negate any likelihood of confusion. The court concluded that the Board’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and that Fuente had not shown any harmful legal error. The decision of the TTAB was therefore affirmed. View "FUENTE MARKETING LTD. v. VAPOROUS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC " on Justia Law

A trademark holder brought an action against numerous foreign online vendors, alleging that they infringed her registered mark by selling counterfeit goods through e-commerce platforms such as Walmart.com and eBay.com. The vendors, all based in China, operated online storefronts that were accessible from the United States and offered shipping to U.S. customers, including those in Illinois. The plaintiff attached a “Schedule A” list to her complaint identifying the vendors. The defendants did not initially appear in the case.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, entered a default judgment against the defendants. The court found personal jurisdiction over them on the basis that they operated online stores targeting U.S. consumers, offered shipping to Illinois, and had allegedly sold infringing products to Illinois residents. The evidence supporting the finding of Illinois sales included website screenshots showing that a product could be ordered and shipped to a Chicago address, but did not show that any actual sales to Illinois occurred. After the default judgment, the defendants appeared and moved to vacate the judgment, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction and improper service. The district court denied the motion, reaffirming its prior findings.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that there was no evidence of any actual sales to Illinois residents. The court held that merely operating an online store accessible in Illinois and offering shipping to Illinois, without completed sales in the forum, is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. The district court’s findings to the contrary were clearly erroneous. The Seventh Circuit vacated the default judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Liu v. Monthly" on Justia Law