Justia Trademark Opinion Summaries

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This appeal arose out of trademark litigation initiated by RXD against Apple over rights to use the "ipad" mark. After the district court awarded summary judgment in favor of Apple on all claims advanced by RXD and on all counterclaims asserted by Apple, the district court permanently enjoined RXD from any commercial use of the terms "ipad" or "ipod." RXD challenges the district court's infringement rulings.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Apple on both its claims and counterclaims, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its award of injunctive relief to Apple. The court concluded that Apple had an established, protected mark capable of being infringed by RXD's use of the mark in 2016. The court explained that RXD's use of "ipad" on its ipadtoday.com website was not subject to "first user" protection. The court also concluded that a jury could not have reasonably concluded that RXD’s use of the "ipad" mark was unlikely to cause consumer confusion. Therefore, the district court did not err in awarding summary judgment to Apple on its claim of trademark infringement. Given the clear evidence of RXD's infringement of Apple's use of the "ipad" mark, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the injunctive relief in favor of Apple.The court rejected RXD's contention that the district court erred in holding that Apple met its burden of establishing a bona fide intent to use the "ipad" mark for cloud storage services. Rather, contrary to RXD's assertion, Apple did not apply to use the "ipad" mark for cloud storage. The court explained that Apple was not required to prove a bona fide intent to use a trademark for services not identified in its application. Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that Apple had a bona fide intent to use the mark for the services listed in its application. View "RXD Media, LLC v. IP Application Development LLC" on Justia Law

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QuikTrip and Weigel operate gasoline-convenience stores. QuikTrip has sold food and beverages in its stores under the registered mark QT KITCHENS since 2011. In 2014, Weigel began using the stylized mark W KITCHENS. QuikTrip requested that Weigel stop using the mark on the basis that it was confusingly similar to QuikTrip’s QT KITCHENS mark. Weigel modified its mark by changing the plural “KITCHENS” to the singular “KITCHEN,” altering the font, and adding the words “WEIGEL’S” and “NOW OPEN.” QuikTrip objected to Weigel’s continued use of the word “KITCHEN” in its mark. In 2017, Weigel applied to register the mark, W WEIGEL’S KITCHEN NOW OPEN.QuikTrip filed an opposition, 15 U.S.C. 1052(d). The Patent and Trademark Office Board evaluated the likelihood of confusion between the marks, referencing the “DuPont” factors, and found that the parties’ identical-in-part goods and related services, overlapping trade channels, overlapping classes of customers, and similar conditions of purchase pointed to a likelihood of confusion but that the dissimilarity of the marks weighed against a likelihood of confusion. It determined that customers would not focus on the word “KITCHEN” for source indication and that Weigel did not act in bad faith in adopting the mark. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of QuikTrip’s opposition. The finding that the marks, in their entireties, differ in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression is supported by substantial evidence. View "QuikTrip West, Inc. v. Weigel Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

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Canal appealed from the district court's judgment awarding $1.1 million in statutory damages to Omega for Canal's contributory infringement of Omega's trademarks. The infringement arose from sales of counterfeit Omega watches at Canal's property in Manhattan.The Second Circuit dismissed Canal's appeal of the denial of summary judgment, holding that the interlocutory appeal is not appealable. The court explained that once the case proceeds to a full trial on the merits, the trial record supersedes the record existing at the time of the summary judgment motion, and there is no basis for this court to review issues raised in a denied motion overtaken by trial.The court nonetheless affirmed the judgment on the merits via appeal of the jury instructions, holding that Canal's position is inconsistent with Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), which held that a defendant may be liable for contributory trademark infringement if it was willfully blind as to the identity of potential infringers—that is, under circumstances in which the defendant did not know the identity of specific infringers. The court reasoned that this holding precludes Canal's argument that Omega needed to identify a specific infringer to whom Canal continued to lease property. At trial, Omega pursued a theory of willful blindness, and the district court's jury instructions accurately captured Tiffany's requirements. Finally, the court found no reversible error in regard to the district court's evidentiary and damages ruling. View "Omega SA v. 375 Canal, LLC" on Justia Law

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SCAD filed suit against Sportswear for trademark infringement, unfair competition, false designation of origin, and counterfeiting under the Lanham Act, and for unfair competition and trademark infringement under Georgia common law. The dispute involves Sportswear's use of SCAD's word marks "SCAD" and "SAVANNAH COLLEGE OF ART AND DESIGN" as well as the college's design mark that includes its mascot, Art the Bee.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment on remand, holding that the district court properly entered summary judgment on two Lanham Act claims and the corresponding permanent injunction enjoining Sportswear from selling products bearing the SCAD marks at issue. The court concluded that its trademark precedents of Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975), Univ. of Ga. Ath. Ass'n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1985), and Savannah College of Art & Design, Inc. v. Sportswear, Inc., 872 F.3d 1256, 1264, 1265 (11th Cir. 2017), require affirmance of the district court's judgment. In this case, the district court correctly found a likelihood of confusion as to Sportswear's use of SCAD's word marks and Bee Design Mark. View "Savannah College of Art and Design, Inc. v. Sportswear, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of defendants on a copyright infringement claim and affirmed the district court's dismissal and grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on a trademark claim concerning the book "Oh, the Places You'll Boldly Go!," (the mash-up) a Dr. Seuss and Star Trek mash-up.The panel held that the mash-up does not make fair use of "Oh, the Places You'll Go!" (the original work). The panel explained that the purpose and character of the mash-up; the nature of the original work; the amount and substantiality of the original work; and the potential market for or value of Seuss, all weigh against fair use. The panel concluded that the bottom line is that ComicMix created, without seeking permission or a license, a non-transformative commercial work that targets and usurps the original work's potential market, and ComicMix cannot sustain a fair use defense. The panel also held that Seuss does not have a cognizable trademark infringement claim against ComicMix because the Lanham Act did not apply under the Rogers test. In this case, the allegedly valid trademarks in the title, the typeface, and the style of the original work were relevant to achieving the mash-up's artistic purpose, and the use of the claimed original work trademarks was not explicitly misleading. View "Dr. Seuss Enterprises, LP v. ComicMix LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's judgment concluding that Green Thumb did not violate Ohio's Deceptive Trade Practices Act, holding that Wooster Floral & Gifts, LLC failed to demonstrate that Green Thumb Floral & Garden Center, Inc.'s use of the domain name www.woosterfloral.com caused a likelihood of confusion as to the source of goods sold on the website.Green Thumb owned the domain name www.woosterfloral.com. Wooster Floral & Gifts, a competing flower shop, brought this lawsuit under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act seeking to block Green Thumb from using the address. The trial court ruled in favor of Green Thumb, finding that Green Thumb's use of the domain name was unlikely to cause confusion as to the source of goods or services because the home page was clearly identified as "Green Thumb Floral" and there was no use of the trade name "Wooster Floral" within the website. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under both federal precedent and the plain terms of the Ohio statute, a consumer landing on Green Thumb's website was unlikely to be confused about the entity that would be fulfilling the consumer's order. View "Wooster Floral & Gifts, LLC v. Green Thumb Floral & Garden Center, Inc." on Justia Law

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Future Proof filed suit against Coors for trademark infringement, claiming that consumers would confuse Coors' hard seltzer beverage "Vizzy" with Future Proof's hard seltzer beverage "Brizzy."The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Future Proof's motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Future Proof cannot determine a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims. In this case, the district court considered the digits of confusion and concluded that three digits supported the injunction and one weighed "marginally in favor of granting the injunction . . . ." But the district court correctly concluded that the other four factors did not support the injunction. The district court also notably concluded correctly that the two digits that have special importance, namely the sixth—which "may alone be sufficient to justify an inference that there is a likelihood of confusion,"—and the seventh—which constitutes the "best evidence of a likelihood of confusion,"—did not support the injunction. View "Future Proof Brands, LLC v. Molson Coors Beverage Co." on Justia Law

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CFC appealed the district court's dismissal based on summary judgment of its complaint alleging trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and unfair competition by Energizer. CFC contends that its trademark for automobile air fresheners, consisting of the words "Black Ice," is infringed and diluted by Energizer's sale of products labeled with the words "Midnight Black Ice Storm" and that its trademark, consisting of the words "Bayside Breeze," is infringed and diluted by Energizer's sale of products labeled with the words "Boardwalk Breeze."The Second Circuit concluded that the record developed by CFC sufficed to withstand Energizer's motion for summary judgment with respect to CFC's mark "Black Ice" but not its mark "Bayside Breeze." Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment for Energizer on CFC's federal trademark infringement claim with respect to its "Black Ice" mark; affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Energizer on CFC's federal trademark infringement claim with respect to the "Bayside Breeze" mark; affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Energizer on CFC's federal trademark dilution claim with respect to both marks; reversed the grant of summary judgment for Energizer on CFC's state law claims with respect to the "Black Ice" mark; and affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Energizer on CFC's state law claims with respect to the "Bayside Breeze" mark. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Car-Freshner Corp. v. American Covers, LLC" on Justia Law

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SFM owns the federal registration for SPROUTS for use in connection with grocery store services. The SPROUTS mark was first used in commerce not later than April 2002. Corcamore owns a federal trademark registration for SPROUT for use in connection with vending machine services, claiming a first use date of May 2008. Corcamore’s SPROUT mark is used on a cashless payment card, an associated customer loyalty program, and a website for customers.SFM filed a petition with the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to cancel Corcamore’s registration. Corcamore argued that SFM lacked standing. The Board determined that the Supreme Court’s Lexmark decision was not applicable; Lexmark was limited to civil actions for false advertising (15 U.S.C. 1125(a)) and does not extend to cancellation of registered marks (section 1064). The court concluded that SFM had standing because it sufficiently alleged a real interest in the proceeding and a reasonable belief of damage. Corcamore informed SFM’s counsel that it would bring “procedural maneuvers,” then proceeded to file motions in violation of Board orders, to refuse to cooperate with discovery, and to disregard Board-imposed sanctions.The Board granted SFM default judgment, citing 37 C.F.R. 2.120(h) and its inherent authority to control its docket. The Board concluded that a lesser sanction would be inappropriate because Corcamore had already violated sanctions and had engaged in willful, bad-faith tactics, consistent with its “procedural maneuvers” letter, taxing Board resources. The Federal Circuit affirmed. SFM was entitled to maintain a petition for cancellation of trademark registrations. The Board did not abuse its discretion in imposing default judgment. View "Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC" on Justia Law

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Ezaki, a Japanese confectionery company, makes and sells “Pocky,” thin, stick-shaped cookies that are partly coated with chocolate or flavored cream. The end of each is left partly uncoated to serve as a handle. In 1978, Ezaki started selling Pocky in the U.S. and began registering U.S. trademarks and patents. It has two Pocky product configurations registered as trade dresses and has a patent for a “Stick Shaped Snack and Method for Producing the Same.” In 1983, the Lotte confectionery company started making Pepero stick-shaped cookies partly coated in chocolate or flavored cream. Pepero “looks remarkably like Pocky.”In 1993-1995, Ezaki sent letters, notifying Lotte of its registered trade dress and asking it to cease and desist. Ezaki took no further action until 2015, when it sued, alleging trademark infringement and unfair competition, under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114, 1125(a)(1)(A). Under New Jersey law, it alleged trademark infringement and unfair competition. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Lotte, holding that because Pocky’s product configuration is functional, it is not protected as trade dress. Trade dress is limited to features that identify a product’s source. Patent law protects useful inventions, but trademark law does not. View "Ezaki Gliko Kabushiki Kaisha v. Lotte International America Corp." on Justia Law