Justia Trademark Opinion Summaries

Top Brand and Cozy Comfort are competitors in the market for oversized hooded sweatshirts. Cozy Comfort owns a design patent (D788 patent) and two trademarks for "THE COMFY" related to blanket throws. Top Brand sought a declaratory judgment of noninfringement of the design patent, while Cozy Comfort counterclaimed for infringement of both the design patent and trademarks. The jury found in favor of Cozy Comfort, determining that Top Brand had infringed both the design patent and the trademarks, and awarded Cozy Comfort $15.4 million for patent infringement and $3.08 million for trademark infringement.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied Top Brand's motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and entered judgment based on the jury's verdict. Top Brand then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The Federal Circuit held that the principles of prosecution history disclaimer apply to design patents. The court found that Top Brand was entitled to JMOL of noninfringement of the design patent because the accused design fell within the scope of the subject matter surrendered during prosecution. The court also concluded that substantial evidence did not support the jury’s verdict of trademark infringement. Consequently, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of JMOL and found in favor of Top Brand on both the design patent and trademark infringement claims. View "Top Brand LLC v. Cozy Comfort Co." on Justia Law

Doctor’s Best, Inc. (DB), a Delaware corporation, developed a new line of supplements branded as "Nature’s Day" and sought a U.S. trademark. Nature’s Way Products, LLC (NWP), a Wisconsin company owning the "Nature’s Way" trademark, claimed this infringed on their trademark. DB’s "Nature’s Day" products were manufactured and transported within the U.S. but sold exclusively abroad. DB sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement, while NWP counterclaimed for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of DB, concluding that NWP failed to show a likelihood of consumer confusion from DB’s domestic conduct. The court applied the extraterritoriality framework from Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc., determining that only DB’s U.S. transport of the products was actionable under the Lanham Act. The court found no genuine issue of material fact regarding the likelihood of consumer confusion from this conduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court correctly applied the Abitron framework to isolate DB’s domestic conduct and properly used the Sleekcraft factors to assess the likelihood of consumer confusion. The court agreed that no rational jury could find that DB’s domestic transport of "Nature’s Day" products infringed NWP’s trademarks. The court also upheld the district court’s denial of NWP’s request for additional discovery time, noting NWP’s lack of diligence in pursuing discovery. View "Doctor’s Best, Inc. v. Nature’s Way Products, LLC" on Justia Law

Wudi Industrial (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. (Wudi) and Wai L. Wong, along with Wong’s business entity GT Omega Racing, Ltd. (collectively Wong), were involved in a trademark dispute over the use of the "GTRACING" and "GT OMEGA RACING" marks. Wudi registered the "GTRACING" trademark in 2017, and Wong initiated cancellation proceedings, claiming prior use of a similar mark. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ruled in favor of Wong in 2020. Wudi sought review in the Eastern District of Virginia, leading to a settlement agreement in 2021, which included geographic and product-based restrictions on Wudi’s use of the "GTRACING" mark, particularly in Europe.The district court granted a stay pending compliance with the settlement agreement. Wong later alleged that Wudi breached the agreement by violating social media restrictions within the European Carve-Out. The district court found Wudi in violation and ordered specific performance. Wudi appealed, and the Fourth Circuit remanded for further proceedings, requiring the district court to comply with procedural requirements for injunctive relief.On remand, the district court issued an injunction, finding that Wudi breached the settlement agreement by using prohibited terms on social media within the European Carve-Out. The court applied the eBay factors, concluding that Wong suffered irreparable harm, monetary damages were inadequate, the balance of hardships favored Wong, and the public interest supported enforcing the agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s injunction. The court held that the district court had the authority to enforce the settlement agreement, the eBay factors were properly applied, and Wudi’s contentions regarding extraterritoriality, parol evidence, unclean hands, and attorney’s fees were without merit. The injunction was upheld, requiring Wudi to comply with the settlement agreement’s terms. View "Wudi Industrial (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. v. Wong" on Justia Law

BenShot, LLC, a family-owned business, sells a unique drinking glass design featuring a bullet "penetrating" the side. 2 Monkey Trading, LLC and Lucky Shot USA, LLC (the Debtors) sell similar glasses imported from China, falsely advertised as "Made in the United States." BenShot sued the Debtors in the Eastern District of Wisconsin for Lanham Act violations and Wisconsin common law. A jury found in favor of BenShot, awarding punitive damages and determining the Debtors acted maliciously or in intentional disregard of BenShot's rights.Following the jury verdict, the Debtors filed for bankruptcy under Subchapter V of Chapter 11. BenShot argued that the jury award was a non-dischargeable debt for willful and malicious injury under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(6) and 1192(2). The Debtors moved to dismiss, claiming § 523(a)(6) only applied to individual debtors, not corporate debtors like themselves. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida agreed with the Debtors and dismissed BenShot's complaint, relying on similar interpretations by other bankruptcy courts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under § 1192, both individual and corporate debtors cannot discharge any debts of the kind listed in § 523(a). The court found the plain language of § 1192 unambiguous, applying to both individual and corporate debtors, and that "debt" as defined in the Bankruptcy Code does not distinguish between individual or corporate debtors. The court reversed the bankruptcy court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Benshot, LLC v. 2 Monkey Trading, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1991, three singers—Di Reed, Tonya Harris, and Joi Marshall—formed the vocal group Jade, which achieved significant success in the early 1990s. The group disbanded in 1995, and the members pursued individual careers. In 2018, the three agreed to a reunion tour and jointly applied for the "JADE" service mark, which was approved in 2019. However, the reunion tour did not materialize, and in 2021, Marshall and Harris performed with another singer, Myracle Holloway, under the JADE mark, leading Reed to file a lawsuit.Reed sued Marshall, Harris, and Holloway in the Southern District of Texas, alleging Lanham Act violations, including trademark infringement, dilution, and unfair competition, as well as Texas state law claims. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that Reed could not allege Lanham Act claims against her co-owners of the mark or Holloway, who performed with their permission.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Lanham Act does not authorize claims between co-owners of a trademark. It affirmed the district court's summary judgment, stating that co-owners of a mark cannot sue each other for infringement or dilution under the Lanham Act. The court also found that Reed's unfair competition claims could not survive summary judgment and that there was no supplemental jurisdiction over the Texas law claims. The court emphasized that co-owners have the right to use the mark as they please, and a valid licensee of one co-owner cannot be liable to another co-owner for infringement. View "Reed v. Marshall" on Justia Law

TWD, LLC filed a complaint against Grunt Style LLC in 2018, alleging trademark infringement. Both companies sell goods with military-related trademarks. Grunt Style counterclaimed, asserting TWD was infringing on its prior trademark. The district court granted Grunt Style's motion for partial summary judgment in April 2022, dismissing all of TWD's claims. The case was reassigned to Judge Hunt, who held a bench trial in 2024 and ordered TWD to pay Grunt Style $739,500. Grunt Style moved to amend the judgment to include interest and permanent injunctive relief, which the district court granted in January 2025.TWD filed a notice of appeal from the amended judgment, which was docketed as appeal No. 25-1305. During a preliminary review, the Seventh Circuit identified a potential jurisdictional issue because the district court's judgment did not explicitly address TWD's counterclaims. The court directed the parties to address whether the judgment was deficient. TWD filed an amended notice of appeal, which was docketed as a new appeal, No. 25-1341. The district court later issued an indicative ruling, signaling its intent to correct the judgment if the case was remanded.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court's solution and decided to remand the case for correction of the clerical mistake in the judgment. The court retained jurisdiction over the appeal and dismissed the second appeal (No. 25-1341) as unnecessary, without collecting an additional fee. The court emphasized the importance of clear and complete judgments to avoid jurisdictional issues and ensure appellate jurisdiction is clear. View "Grunt Style LLC v TWD, LLC" on Justia Law

Rebecca Curtin filed an opposition to United Trademark Holdings’ (UTH) registration of the mark RAPUNZEL for dolls and toy figures, claiming the mark was generic, descriptive, and failed to function as a trademark. Curtin, a doll collector and mother, argued that the registration would harm consumers by reducing competition and increasing prices for Rapunzel merchandise. She also claimed it would chill the creation of new Rapunzel-themed dolls and toys.The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) dismissed Curtin’s opposition, concluding she was not statutorily entitled to oppose the registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1063. The TTAB applied the Lexmark framework, which requires a plaintiff to fall within the zone of interests protected by the statute and to show a reasonable belief in damage proximately caused by the registration. The TTAB found that Curtin, as a consumer, did not have a commercial interest protected by the Lanham Act and that her alleged injuries were too remote and speculative.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the TTAB’s decision, agreeing that the Lexmark framework was correctly applied. The court held that the interests protected by the Lanham Act in this context are commercial, and Curtin, as a consumer, did not fall within the zone of interests. Additionally, the court found that Curtin’s alleged injuries were derivative of harms to commercial actors and too remote to establish proximate causation. Thus, Curtin was not entitled to oppose the registration of the RAPUNZEL mark. View "CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. " on Justia Law

Vetements Group AG filed applications to register two marks, "VETEMENTS" in standard characters and in stylized form, for clothing items and online retail store services featuring clothing. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Examining Attorney refused the applications, asserting that the marks were generic or merely descriptive without acquired distinctiveness, and thus barred from registration under Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act.The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Board) affirmed the Examining Attorney's refusal, applying the foreign equivalents doctrine. The Board found that "VETEMENTS," which translates to "clothing" in English, was generic for the identified goods and services. The Board also determined that the marks were highly descriptive and that Vetements Group AG failed to establish acquired distinctiveness among U.S. consumers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the Board's decision. The court agreed that the foreign equivalents doctrine was correctly applied, noting that an appreciable number of Americans are capable of translating "VETEMENTS" from French to English. The court found substantial evidence supporting the Board's conclusion that the marks were generic, as they directly referred to the genus of goods and services in question. Consequently, the court affirmed the Board's decision to refuse registration of the marks. View "In Re VETEMENTS GROUP AG " on Justia Law

Thomas D. Foster, APC (Foster) sought to register the trademark "US SPACE FORCE" for various goods and services. The application was filed on March 19, 2018, shortly after President Donald J. Trump announced the creation of a new military branch called the Space Force. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) examining attorney refused the registration, citing a false suggestion of a connection with the United States under § 2(a) of the Lanham Act.The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Board) affirmed the examining attorney’s refusal, concluding that the mark falsely suggested a connection with the United States. Foster requested reconsideration, arguing that the Board erred by not crediting the filing date of the intent-to-use application as the constructive use date and by relying on evidence post-dating the filing date. The Board denied reconsideration, maintaining that Foster was not the prior user and that there was ample evidence supporting the false connection analysis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the appropriate timing for assessing a false suggestion of a connection includes evidence up to the time of examination, which in this case extended through the Board’s December 12, 2022 decision. The court found substantial evidence supporting the Board’s findings that the mark "US SPACE FORCE" was the same as or a close approximation of a name or identity used by the United States and that it pointed uniquely and unmistakably to the United States. The court affirmed the Board’s decision, concluding that the mark falsely suggested a connection with the United States and was therefore unregistrable under § 2(a) of the Lanham Act. View "In Re FOSTER" on Justia Law

Oscar Hernandez allegedly sustained injuries from a RIDGID-branded nail gun purchased from Home Depot. The nail gun, designed and manufactured by other companies, was marketed and sold by Home Depot under a trademark license agreement with Ridge Tool Company. Hernandez filed a complaint against Ridge Tool Company and Home Depot, asserting claims of strict liability, negligence, breach of express warranty, and breach of implied warranty of fitness. The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada.The respondents moved for summary judgment, arguing that Ridge Tool Company should not be held strictly liable as it only licensed the RIDGID trademark and did not participate in the design, manufacture, distribution, or sale of the nail gun. The U.S. District Court granted summary judgment on all claims except the strict liability claim, noting the lack of controlling precedent in Nevada on whether a trademark licensor can be held strictly liable under such circumstances. The court certified the question to the Supreme Court of Nevada.The Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that Nevada does not impose strict products liability on an entity whose only involvement with a defective product is licensing its trademark for marketing purposes. The court adopted the rule set forth in section 14 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, which states that a trademark licensor is not subject to strict liability unless it substantially participates in the design, manufacture, or distribution of the product. The court answered the certified question in the negative, holding that a trademark licensor cannot be held strictly liable for damages caused by a defective product if its role is limited to licensing its trademark. View "HERNANDEZ VS. THE HOME DEPOT, INC." on Justia Law