Justia Trademark Opinion Summaries

Smart Candle sells light-emitting diode flameless candles and commercial lighting systems internationally. Excell sued under the LanhamAct alleging that Smart Candle’s use of the trade name and trademark “Smart Candle” infringed rights that Excell had over use of that name and trademark. Selective insured Smart Candle during the period in which the Excell suit commenced, but disclaimed coverage, based on exclusion any injury “arising out of the infringement of copyright, patent, trademark, trade secret or other intellectual property rights” that “does not apply to infringement in your ‘advertisement’ of copyright, trade dress or slogan.” Excell won its suit. Selective sought a declaration that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify. Smart Candle counterclaimed breach of contract, arguing that Selective had not conducted “reasonable investigation of Excell’s Claims” including “a review of Smart Candle’s website . . . or any of Smart Candle’s advertising before denying coverage.” The district court granted Selective summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that no reasonable jury would conclude that Excell was suing for slogan infringement and that Selective had no duty to investigate “beyond the four corners of the complaint” to determine whether other facts could trigger Selective’s duty to defend or indemnify. View "Selective Ins. Co. v. Smart Candle, LLC" on Justia Law

Buckminster Fuller, “Bucky,” a designer, author, and inventor, well known for popularizing the geodesic dome, died in 1983. Beginning around 2009, Maxfield manufactured and distributed products under the Buckyball and related trademarks. According to its press release, Buckyballs, “the world’s best-selling desktoy,” were “inspired and named after famous … inventor, R. Buckminster Fuller.” Buckyballs are round magnets packaged in a cube shape, which can be formed into various shapes. The Big Book of Bucky, which provides instructions, states: Buckyballs were named for Buckminster Fuller. Fuller’s Estate sued, alleging: unfair competition, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a) (Lanham Act); invasion of privacy (appropriation of name and likeness); unauthorized use of name and likeness, Cal. Civil Code 3344.1; and violation of Cal. Business & Professions Code 17200. Alterra had issued an insurance policy to Maxfield, effective June 2010. Alterra agreed to defend under a reservation of rights, then sought a declaration that Alterra’s policy did not provide coverage. The Estate agreed to be bound by the outcome in return for being dismissed. Because of Maxfield’s stipulation to the allegations in the coverage action and acting without leave, the Estate later responded to Alterra’s complaint. The court of appeal affirmed a holding that Alterra had no duty to defend and no duty to indemnify, based on the “intellectual property” exclusion. View "Alterra Excess & Surplus Ins. Co. v. Estate of Buckminster Fuller" on Justia Law

Marcel filed suit against Lucky Brand, seeking damages and injunctive relief based on claims of trademark infringement, false designation of origin, and unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. 1114, 1116, and 1125, as well as common law trademark infringement and unfair competition under Fla. Stat. 495.151. On appeal, Marcel challenged the district court's judgment in favor of Lucky Brand. The court concluded that a prior judgment in Marcel's favor awarding damages and an injunction did not bar Marcel from instituting a second suit seeking relief for alleged further infringements that occurred subsequent to the earlier judgment. Accordingly, the court vacated the grant of summary judgment and the denial of leave to amend the complaint. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Marcel's motion to hold Lucky Brand in contempt for violation of an injunction in the prior litigation because Marcel did not show that Lucky Brand's conduct violated the terms of the injunction. View "Marcel Fashions v. Lucky Brand Dungarees" on Justia Law

This dispute over a commercial relationship stemmed from an agreement between Pennzoil and Miller Oil where Pennzoil agreed to loan Miller Oil equipment for use at Pit Stop. After Pennzoil discovered that Pit Stop was using mislabeled bulk oil that Pit Stop claimed was a Pennzoil product, Pennzoil filed a trademark infringement lawsuit. The district court concluded that Pennzoil's marks are valid and protectable, and that there was a likelihood of confusion between Miller Oil's marks and Pennzoil's marks, such that the use of the latter by defendants constituted trademark infringement. The district court considered Miller Oil's affirmative defense of acquiescence and ruled that Pennzoil had implicitly and explicitly assured Pit Stop that the use of the Pennzoil trademarks and trade dress were allowed, and that Miller Oil relied upon Pennzoil's assurances. The court concluded that, given Miller Oil did not establish undue prejudice, the district court's legal conclusion that Pennzoil had acquiesced was error. Allowing Miller Oil to continue to display Pennzoil's marks in light of an unchallenged determination of trademark infringement would be the type of "unjustified windfall" the court previously condemned. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's finding of acquiescence and vacated the elements of the injunction allowing Miller Oil to use Pennzoil's marks. View "Pennzoil-Quaker State v. Miller Oil and Gas" on Justia Law

Hope Road, an entity owned by Bob Marley's children, granted Zion an exclusive license to design, manufacture, and sell t-shirts and other merchandise bearing Marley's image. Hope Road and Zion filed suit against multiple defendants who were involved in the sale of competing Marley merchandise, alleging claims arising from defendants' use of Marley's likeness. The court concluded that the district court did not err by denying defendants' post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law on the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), false endorsement claim where defendants waived several defenses to plaintiffs' claims by failing to properly raise them in the district court; the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in determining the profits for Defendants A.V.E.L.A., Freeze, and Jem where there was sufficient evidence to find Freeze willfully infringed plaintiffs' rights because Freeze's vice president of licensing testified that she knew that plaintiffs had the right to merchandising Marley's image before Freeze began selling similar goods; the Seventh Amendment does not require that a jury calculate these profits because juries have not traditionally done so, and a claim for profit disgorgement is equitable in nature; the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering A.V.E.L.A. defendants to pay attorneys' fees; the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on the right of publicity claim; there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that A.V.E.L.A. defendants interfered with prospective economic advantage; and the district court did not err in granting defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of punitive damages. View "Fifty-Six Hope Road Music v. A.V.E.L.A." on Justia Law

Newbridge, headquartered in Newbridge, Ireland, designs, manufactures and sells housewares and silverware around the world under the mark NEWBRIDGE HOME. Newbridge designs its products in Newbridge, Ireland, and manufactures someof its products there. In the U.S. its products are available for sale through its website and through retail outlets that feature products from Ireland. The NEWBRIDGE HOME mark is the subject of an International Registration, which was filed through the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization. Newbridge sought protection of the mark pursuant to the Madrid Agreement and Madrid Protocol, under which the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) examines international registrations for compliance with U.S. law, 15 U.S.C. 1141. Newbridge disclaimed the word HOME apart from the mark as a whole in the application. It sought registration for listed items of silverware, jewelry, desk items and kitchenware. The Trademark Examiner refused to register the mark as being primarily geographically descriptive. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed. The Federal Circuit reversed. The evidence as a whole suggests that Newbridge, Ireland, is not generally known; to the relevant public the mark NEWBRIDGE is not primarily geographically descriptive of the goods, which is what matters. View "In re: Newbridge Cutlery Co." on Justia Law

Pom Wonderful, owner of the "POM" standard character mark, filed a trademark infringement claim against Pur to stop Pur from using the word "pom" on its pomegranate-flavored energy drink. On appeal, Pom Wonderful challenged the district court's order of its motion for a preliminary injunction. The court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in finding that Pom Wonderful is unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claim. Because the district court's decision to deny Pom Wonderful's motion for a preliminary injunction was tainted by its mistaken likelihood-of-success determination, the court remanded with instructions to the district court to consider whether Pom Wonderful meets its burden of proving the other elements of a preliminary injunction. View "Pom Wonderful v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

St. Helena conducts a 10-day residential health improvement program at its California in-patient facility. St. Helena applied to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to register the mark “TAKETEN,” identifying the service as “[h]ealth care services, namely, evaluating weight and lifestyle health and implementing weight and lifestyle health improvement plans in a hospital-based residential program” in class 44. The examiner refused to register the mark, citing likelihood of confusion with the “TAKE 10!” mark shown in the 657 Registration and commonly owned U.S. Registration 182 for the mark “TAKE 10! (and Design). Both cited registrations are for “printed manuals, posters, stickers, activity cards and educational worksheets dealing with physical activity and physical fitness” in class 16. The registration for “TAKE 10! (and Design)” also identifies goods in class 9: “pre-recorded videocassettes featuring physical activity and physical fitness promotion programs.” The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed under 15 U.S.C. 1052(d). The Federal Circuit reversed, agreeing with the Board’s assessment of the respective marks themselves, but holding that substantial evidence did not support the denial based on the 657 Registration, given the dissimilarities in the respective services and goods and the high degree of consumer care. View "In re: St. Helena Hosp." on Justia Law

WWE seeks ex parte seizure and temporary restraining orders against unnamed defendants under the ex parte seizure provision of the Trademark Counterfeiting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1116. WWE alleged that defendants work as "fly-by-night" counterfeiters, setting up shop near WWE events and cannibalizing WWE's merchandise sales by purveying unauthorized products. The district court denied relief and certified its order for interlocutory appeal. The court concluded that, in this case, the persons against whom seizure would be ordered are readily identifiable as any non-affiliated person purporting to sell WWE merchandise at or near a live WWE event; WWE has met its burden under section 1116(d), and the orders sought here should issue; and the court did not address the validity of a provision of the proposed order purporting to deputize private citizens, leaving it to the district court to address in the first instance. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "World Wrestling Entertainment v. Unidentified Part" on Justia Law

After leaving Gensler, an architectural firm with projects throughout the world, where he had been a Design Director, Strabala opened his own firm, 2Define Architecture. Strabala stated online that he had designed five projects for which Gensler is the architect of record. Gensler contends that Strabala’s statements, a form of “reverse passing off,” violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.1125(a). The district court dismissed, ruling that, because Strabala did not say that he built or sold these structures, he could not have violated section 43(a), reading the Supreme Court decision Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox (2003), to limit section 43(a) to false designations of goods’ origin. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that Gensler maintains that Strabala falsely claims to have been the creator of intellectual property. View "M. Arthur Gensler, Jr. & Assocs., Inc. v. Strabala" on Justia Law