Justia Trademark Opinion Summaries

Marshak appealed the district court's preliminary injunction for HRE enjoining Marshak from using the "The Platters" mark in connection with any vocal group with narrow exceptions. At issue was whether the likelihood of irreparable harm must be established - rather than presumed, as under prior Ninth Circuit precedent - by a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief in the trademark context. Following eBay v. MarcExchange and Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction in a trademark infringement case must establish irreparable harm. The court concluded that HRE was not foreclosed from bringing the underlying suit where prior New York actions (Marshak I and Marshak II) did not have res judicata effect; HRE's trademark infringement claim and request for preliminary injunction was not precluded by the doctrine of laches; the record supported the district court's determination that HRE did not abandon "The Platters" mark; but the fact that the district curt made no factual findings that would support a likelihood of establishing irreparable harm, led the court to reverse the preliminary injunction and to remand to the district court. View "HRE v. Florida Entertainment Mgmt." on Justia Law

HFI filed suit against the Bank alleging trademark infringement and related claims, contending that the Bank's use of its "Hana Bank" mark infringed HFI's "Hana Financial" mark because its use of the word "Hana" in connection with financial services would likely cause confusion. A party claiming trademark ownership must establish priority and one of the ways that a party could establish priority was through the constructive use doctrine known as "tacking." Tacking required a highly fact-sensitive inquiry, and the jury decided the issue after receiving an instruction that correctly conveyed the narrowness of the doctrine. In this instance, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on trademark priority where, viewing the marks in context and in their entirety, the ordinary purchasers could perceive them as conveying the same idea or meaning or evoking the same mental reaction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of HFI's motion for judgment as a matter of law on trademark priority and upheld the jury's verdict. View "Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank, et al." on Justia Law

Apple sued Samsung, alleging infringement of Apple patents and dilution of Apple’s trade dress. Samsung counterclaimed, alleging infringement of its own patents. A jury returned a verdict substantially in Apple’s favor, finding that 26 Samsung smartphones and tablets infringed Apple patents and that six Samsung smartphones diluted Apple’s registered iPhone trade dress and unregistered iPhone 3G trade dress. The jury rejected Samsung’s infringement counterclaims and awarded Apple more than $1 billion. The district court set aside a portion of the damages award for certain products and scheduled a partial new trial on damages, but affirmed the jury’s liability findings. The court denied Apple’s request for a permanent injunction. The Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of injunctive relief with respect to design patents and trade dress, but vacated the denial with respect to Apple’s utility patents. The court noted that Samsung has stopped selling the products found to dilute trade dress, but that, with respect to the utility patents, the court must assess whether Apple’s evidence suffices to establish irreparable injury. View "Apple, Inv. v. Samsung Elecs. Co." on Justia Law

Starbucks filed suit against Black Bear claiming, among other things, trademark dilution in violation of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), 15 U.S.C. 1125(c), 1127. The district court denied Starbucks request for an injunction, concluding that Starbucks failed to prove that Black Bear's "Charbucks" marks at issue were likely to dilute Starbucks' famous "Starbucks" marks. The court concluded that the district court did not err in its factual findings that there was only a minimal degree of similarity between the Starbucks marks and the Charbucks marks and that Starbucks demonstrated only a weak association between the marks. Balancing the section 1125(c)(2)(B) factors and other facts that bear on a likelihood of dilution, the court agreed with the district court that Starbucks failed to show that Black Bear's use of its marks in commerce was likely to dilute the Starbucks marks. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc." on Justia Law

Kraft sued Cracker Barrel Old Country Store for trademark infringement, Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051, and obtained a preliminary injunction against the sale of food products to grocery stores under the name Cracker Barrel, which is a registered trademark of Kraft. Kraft has been selling cheese in grocery stores under that name for more than 50 years. Kraft did not challenge CBOCS’s right to sell the products under the name Cracker Barrel in CBOCS’s restaurants, in its “country stores” that adjoin the restaurants, or by mail order or online. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the similarity of the logos, the products, and of the channels of distribution. View "Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc." on Justia Law

Bell appealed the vacatur of a default judgment as void in connection with the manufacture and marketing by Iran of a helicopter that resembled Bell's Jet Ranger 206 in appearance. The court concluded that Bell's interpretation of Rule 60(b)(4) was contrary to the court's precedent, as well as that of almost every other circuit court of appeals, all of which rejected a time limit that would bar Rule 60(b)(4) motions; because Iran never appeared in the district court proceeding resulting in the default judgment, the district court properly applied the traditional definition of voidness in granting Iran's Rule 60(b)(4) motion; and because Bell's evidence regarding the effect in the United States of Iran's commercial activities abroad was either too remote and attenuated to satisfy the direct effect requirement of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2), or too speculative to be considered an effect at all, the district court did not err in ruling the commercial activity exception in the FSIA did not apply. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, et al." on Justia Law

Houston and the District of Columbia each sought to register an official seal as a trademark in connection with various governmental services, including commerce, tourism, business administration, and public utility services. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office refused their applications, citing Section 2(b) of the Lanham Act, which prohibits registration of a proposed trademark that consists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or other insignia of the United States, or of any state or municipality, or of any foreign nation, 15 U.S.C. 1052(b). The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board upheld the denials. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the Board correctly interpreted Section 2. View "In re: City of Houston" on Justia Law

Groeneveld sued Lubecore, claiming that Lubecore’s automotive grease pump is a “virtually identical” copy of Groeneveld’s automotive grease pump. The complaint asserted tradedress infringement in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), and violation of related federal and Ohio laws. The trade-dress claim went to the jury, which found for Groeneveld and awarded it $1,225,000 in damages. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that a company cannot use trade-dress law to protect its functional product design from competition with a “copycat” design made by another company where there is no reasonable likelihood that consumers would confuse the two companies’ products as emanating from a single source. Trademark law is designed to promote brand recognition, not to insulate product manufacturers from lawful competition. View "Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

BDI is the owner a design patent and the manufacturer of slippers known as SNOOZIES®. High Point manufactures and distributes the accused FUZZY BABBA® slippers, which are sold through various retailers, including Meijer, Sears, and WalMart. BDI sent High Point a cease and desist letter, asserting patent infringement. High Point sought a declaratory judgment. The district court held BDI’s asserted design patent invalid on summary judgment and dismissed BDI’s trade dress claims with prejudice. The Federal Circuit reversed. The district court applied the incorrect standard; a reasonable jury could, under the correct standard, find the patent not invalid based on functionality. On remand, the district court should weigh High Point’s notice of BDI’s trade dress claim and initial belief that its original complaint encompassed such a claim and the absence of apparent prejudice to High Point against the fact that BDI had always been in possession of the information added in the proposed amendments and could have asked to clarify its pleading sooner. View "High Point Design LLC v. Buyer's Direct, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Green Day and others, alleging violations of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101 et seq., and the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq., because Green Day used plaintiff's illustration, "Scream Icon," in the video backdrop of its stage show. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Green Day on all claims and the grant of attorney's fees to Green Day under the Copyright Act. The court concluded that Green Day's use of the illustration was fair use under the Copyright Act where the purpose and character of the use was transformative and not overly commercial; the nature of the work included its status as a widely disseminated work of street art; Green Day's use of the work was not excessive in light of its transformative purpose; and Green Day's use did not affect the value of the piece or of plaintiff's artwork in general. In regards to plaintiff's claims under the Lanham Act, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish any trademark rights. The court concluded, however, that the district court clearly erred in finding that plaintiff's claims were objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment but vacated the award of attorneys fees. View "Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., et al." on Justia Law