Justia Trademark Opinion Summaries

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed a decision by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board denying Naterra International, Inc.'s petition for cancellation of Samah Bensalem's BABIES’ MAGIC TEA standard character mark registration. Naterra argued that there was a likelihood of confusion between its BABY MAGIC mark and Bensalem’s BABIES’ MAGIC TEA mark. The Court examined several factors, including the similarity of the marks, the nature of the goods, and the trade channels. The Court found that the Board erred in its assessment of the similarity of the marks and the trade channels and failed to properly evaluate relevant evidence about the nature of the goods. Therefore, the Court vacated the Board's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court also found the Board did not err in its assessment of the fame of Naterra's mark. View "NATERRA INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. BENSALEM " on Justia Law

In 2020, the law firm Chestek PLLC applied for a trademark for the mark "CHESTEK LEGAL" but provided only a P.O. box as its domicile address. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) refused the application because it did not comply with the domicile address requirement. Chestek argued that the rules enforcing this requirement were improperly promulgated under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed the examiner's refusal. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Chestek argued that the domicile address requirement was improperly promulgated for two reasons: the USPTO was required to comply with the requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. § 553 but failed to do so because the proposed rule did not provide notice of the domicile address requirement adopted in the final rule, and the domicile address requirement is arbitrary and capricious because the final rule failed to offer a satisfactory explanation for the domicile address requirement and failed to consider important aspects of the problem it purports to address, such as privacy. The Federal Circuit found the domicile address requirement to be a procedural rule that is exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking. Furthermore, the USPTO's decision to require the address provided by all applicants to be a domicile address was not arbitrary or capricious for failure to provide a reasoned justification. The court affirmed the Board's refusal to register Chestek's mark. View "In Re CHESTEK PLLC " on Justia Law

This case arises from a trademark infringement dispute under the Lanham Act between Rolex Watch USA, Incorporated (Rolex) and Beckertime, L.L.C.; Matthew Becker (Beckertime). Rolex is a luxury watch seller with legally protectable interest in numerous trademarks. Beckertime sells primarily decades-old preowned watches containing Rolex branded parts, including watches identified as “Genuine Rolex,” but contain both Rolex and non-Rolex parts. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, modified in part, and remanded in part the decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.The district court found that Beckertime infringed Rolex’s trademark but refused to disgorge Beckertime of its profits, applying the laches defense. Rolex appealed, seeking a modification to the injunction, treble profits, and attorneys’ fees, while Beckertime sought the application of an alternative test to determine infringement.The Appellate Court upheld the district court's ruling that Beckertime infringed Rolex’s trademark, finding no clear error in the determination. The court affirmed the district court's decision to apply the laches defense, preventing the disgorgement of Beckertime's profits. The court found that Rolex had failed to offer a valid justification for its delay in filing suit and that Beckertime was prejudiced by this delay.Regarding remedies, the Appellate Court found that Rolex was not entitled to treble profits or attorneys’ fees. The court pointed out that Rolex had not moved for attorneys’ fees within the required time period under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2), thereby waiving its right to such fees. Furthermore, the district court found no evidence of deliberate counterfeiting by Beckertime to warrant the imposition of treble profits.The court also addressed the scope of the injunction issued by the district court. It modified the injunction to prohibit the sale of Rolex watches with non-genuine bezels, but upheld the exclusion of all non-genuine dials from the injunction. The court also agreed with Rolex that the typographical errors in one section of the injunction rendered it vague and unqualified, and remanded the case to the district court for clarification. View "Rolex Watch v. Beckertime" on Justia Law

In a trademark dispute between two companies that used the word "Punchbowl" in their marks, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgement in favor of AJ Press, LLC. The court held that AJ Press, LLC's use of the Punchbowl mark was not outside the scope of the Lanham Act under the "Rogers test". The Rogers test, which governs disputes over trademarks that are used in expressive works protected by the First Amendment, does not apply when the accused infringer uses a trademark to designate the source of its own goods. The court found that AJ Press, LLC was using the Punchbowl mark to identify and distinguish its news products. The court reversed the district court's judgement and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to proceed to a likelihood-of-confusion analysis under the Lanham Act. View "Punchbowl, Inc. v. AJ Press, LLC" on Justia Law

In the case between Vans, Inc., VF Outdoor, LLC (collectively "Vans") and MSCHF Product Studio, Inc. ("MSCHF"), the United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to grant a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against MSCHF. MSCHF had created a sneaker, the Wavy Baby, which appeared to mimic Vans' Old Skool shoe. Vans sued MSCHF for trademark and trade dress infringement. MSCHF argued that its use of Vans' marks was protected by the First Amendment. However, the Court of Appeals applied the recent Supreme Court decision in Jack Daniel's Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC, which held that special First Amendment protections do not apply when trademarks are used as source identifiers. The Court of Appeals concluded that Vans was likely to prevail in arguing that MSCHF's Wavy Baby shoes used Vans' marks and trade dress as source identifiers, and that there was a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the Wavy Baby shoes. The court also affirmed the district court's decisions requiring MSCHF to escrow its revenues from Wavy Baby sales and not requiring a bond determination because MSCHF never requested security. View "Vans, Inc. v. MSCHF Product Studio, Inc." on Justia Law

Great Concepts applied to register “DANTANNA’S” as a mark for a “steak and seafood restaurant.” Its 764 Registration issued in 2005. Chutter’s predecessor-in-interest, Dan Tana, subsequently petitioned the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to cancel the Registration, based on an alleged likelihood of confusion with Tana’s common law “DAN TANA” mark for restaurant services. The cancellation proceeding was suspended during a trademark infringement civil suit. In 2009, the district court granted Great Concepts summary judgment; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. In December 2010, the Board dismissed Tana’s cancellation proceeding. Meanwhile, in March 2010, Great Concepts’ then-attorney, Taylor, filed with the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) a combined declaration of use and declaration of incontestability, under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1058, 1065, declaring “there is no proceeding involving said rights pending and not disposed of either in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office or in the courts.” At the time, both the PTO cancellation proceeding and the Eleventh Circuit appeal were pending.In 2015, Chutter successfully petitioned the PTO for cancellation of Great Concepts’ “DANTANNA’S” mark based on Taylor’s 2010 false affidavit. The Federal Circuit reversed. The statute limits the Board’s authority to cancel registration of a mark to circumstances in which the “registration was obtained fraudulently,” but does not authorize cancellation of a registration when the incontestability status of that mark is “obtained fraudulently.” View "Great Concepts, LLC v. Chutter, Inc." on Justia Law

Seven years ago, A.D. was hired to create a PVT (“pressure volume temperature”) simulation software program. Sah was hired by A.D. to develop a PVT software program in exchange for a stake in one of A.D.’s companies, IPSS. Eight months later, a product called InPVT hit the market. Plaintiff Calsep started looking into InPVT. In Calsep’s assessment, A.D. didn’t have the technical skills or resources to develop a PVT product. Calsep filed another motion to compel, alleging that A.D. still hadn’t adequately disclosed his source code control system. Although A.D. had “produced [a] purported source code system” in April and July, Calsep claimed that these productions were “undoubtedly incomplete” and “had been manipulated.” Believing the deletions to be intentional, Calsep filed a motion for sanctions. Afterward, A.D. filed a motion for reconsideration based on newly discovered forensic images that “vindicated” him. The magistrate judge recommended denying the motion, and the district court agreed, denying the motion for reconsideration of the sanctions order. A.D. appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision on A.D.'s motion for reconsideration. The court explained that A.D. cannot offer any reason—other than mere forgetfulness—why he couldn’t acquire the images sooner. Further, A.D. hasn’t shown that he acted with diligence during the case to locate these images. Moreover, the court explained that although A.D. argues that the images change the game, Calsep’s expert insists that too much data is still missing from the source code control system, rendering a proper review impossible. The court noted that there was no reason to question the district court’s judgment crediting Calsep’s expert testimony. View "Calsep v. Dabral" on Justia Law

Defendants Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, LLP and its subsidiary, The Bank of New York Mellon (collectively, “BNYM”), retained Plaintiff as an independent contractor to work on an investment valuation project. Plaintiff developed the so-called Pauwels Model. At various times between 2014 and the end of his working relationship with BNYM in 2018, Plaintiff shared spreadsheets derived from the Pauwels Model with various employees and executives at BNYM. In 2016, BNYM retained Defendants Deloitte LLP, Deloitte Tax LLP, and Deloitte USA LLP (collectively, “Deloitte”) to take over the work that Plaintiff had been performing for BNYM. Plaintiff alleged that Deloitte used the spreadsheets to reverse engineer the Pauwels Model and was using the model to conduct the services it provided to BNYM. Plaintiff brought suit against BNYM and Deloitte, alleging, among other claims, that the Pauwels Model embodied a trade secret that they misappropriated.   The Second Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s judgment insofar as it dismissed Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim. The court affirmed the remainder of the judgment. The court explained that misappropriation is not an element of a claim for unjust enrichment under New York law. Therefore, a plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment does not necessarily rise or fall with a claim of trade secret misappropriation. The court explained that because Plaintiff’s theory of liability is distinct from those underpinning Plaintiff’s claim for trade secret misappropriation, his claim for unjust enrichment should not have been dismissed as duplicative of his claim for trade secret misappropriation. View "Pauwels v. Deloitte LLP" on Justia Law

Proof Research, Inc. and Carbon Six Barrels, LLC both manufacture carbon-fiber gun barrels. Proof entered the market first and obtained a trademark for the unique appearance of its barrels. When Proof found out that Carbon Six intended to begin manufacturing and selling similar-looking carbon-fiber gun barrels of its own, Proof responded with litigation. However, Proof did not file suit against Carbon Six but rather against McGowen Precision Barrels, LLC, Carbon Six’s sister company. McGowen then initiated separate proceedings to have Proof’s trademark canceled. McGowen was ultimately successful, and Proof’s trademark for its carbon-fiber gun barrels was canceled in 2021. On February 9, 2022, Carbon Six filed this lawsuit against Proof for defamation and violation of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act stemming from Proof’s efforts to register, renew, enforce, and defend its previously valid trademark. However, Carbon Six brought its claims after the one-year prescriptive period imposed by Louisiana law had run. On Proof’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Carbon Six failed to convince the district court that any of its claims were timely. The district court also held that Carbon Six’s LUTPA claim was legally deficient.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that all actions Carbon Six alleged Proof took were discrete rather than ongoing, and each began and ended more than a year before this lawsuit was filed. Carbon Six’s LUTPA claim is therefore prescribed. The court explained even if Carbon Six could do so, Proof’s attempt to enforce a later-invalidated trademark does not violate LUTPA. View "Carbon Six Barrels v. Proof Research" on Justia Law

In 1999, Latham, McLean, and Vernooy formed Bliss to sell children’s clothing under the name “bella bliss.” In 2003, Shannon left Bliss and started Latham to sell her own children’s clothing under the name “little english.” Bliss’s logo is a lowercase “b” drawn out as if stitched in thread. Bliss has registered trademarks for this logo. Bliss has several designs that it claims as signature looks of the bella bliss brand that have “become famous and widely known and recognized as symbols of unique and high-quality garments.” There has been previous litigation between the parties.In 2020, Bliss filed federal claims for copyright, trademark, and trade dress infringement; false designation of origin and misappropriation of source; and unfair competition. The district court dismissed Bliss’s claims and granted Latham attorney’s fees for defending the copyright claim but found that Bliss filed its action in good faith and that the trademark and trade dress claims were not so “exceptionally meritless” that Latham merited a rare attorney’s fees award under 15 U.S.C. 1117. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Bliss stated claims for federal and state trademark infringement but has not stated a claim for trade dress infringement. The district court did not err in denying attorney’s fees to Latham for defending the trademark and trade dress infringement claims. View "Bliss Collection, LLC v. Latham Companies, LLC" on Justia Law