Justia Trademark Opinion Summaries

In 2022, two top officers of the Libertarian Party of Michigan resigned, leading to a power struggle within the party. Andrew Chadderdon became the acting Chair, but his leadership was contested by the defendants, who then voted to remove him and elected themselves to committee positions. The Libertarian Party Judicial Committee later voided these elections, reinstating Chadderdon. The defendants, however, continued to use the Libertarian National Committee’s (LNC) trademark, claiming to be the rightful leaders of the Michigan affiliate.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted the LNC’s request for a preliminary injunction, barring the defendants from using the LNC’s trademark. The defendants appealed, arguing that the district court’s application of the Lanham Act to their noncommercial speech violated the First Amendment and that their use of the trademark was authorized and not likely to cause confusion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Lanham Act could apply to the defendants’ use of the LNC’s trademark because they used it as a source identifier for their political services, which falls within the scope of the Act. The court also determined that the defendants’ use of the trademark created a likelihood of confusion among potential voters, party members, and donors. However, the court found that the defendants’ use of the trademark for online solicitation, when accompanied by clear disclaimers, did not create a likelihood of confusion.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction in part, except for the aspect concerning the defendants’ online solicitation with disclaimers, which it vacated. View "Libertarian National Committee, Inc. v. Saliba" on Justia Law

Simply Wireless, Inc., a Virginia telecommunications company, sued T-Mobile US, Inc. and T-Mobile USA, Inc. for trademark infringement, alleging that T-Mobile had infringed on its common law trademark "SIMPLY PREPAID." Simply Wireless had used the trademark from 2002 to 2008 and resumed its use in 2012. T-Mobile began using the same trademark in 2014 and applied to register it with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Simply Wireless filed a competing application and subsequently launched a revamped website under the trademark.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment to T-Mobile, ruling that Simply Wireless had abandoned the trademark due to nonuse from 2009 to 2011. The court found that Simply Wireless had not provided sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of abandonment, which is triggered by three consecutive years of nonuse under 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Simply Wireless appealed, arguing that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding its intent to resume use of the trademark during the period of nonuse.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and vacated the district court's summary judgment order. The appellate court found that Simply Wireless had presented sufficient evidence, including a detailed declaration from its CEO and corroborating documents, to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding its intent to resume use of the trademark during the period of nonuse. The court emphasized that the intent-to-resume-use inquiry is an intensely factual question and rarely amenable to summary judgment. The Fourth Circuit also rejected T-Mobile's alternative argument that the statutory abandonment test does not apply to common law trademarks, affirming that the test is applicable.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Simply Wireless, Inc v. T-Mobile US, Inc" on Justia Law

Bruce Molzan, a well-known chef, filed a lawsuit against Bellagreen Holdings, LLC, and other associated entities and individuals, alleging trademark infringement and other claims under the Lanham Act and Texas law. Molzan claimed that he had been using the "RUGGLES" trademarks for over forty years and that the defendants misused these trademarks after a forced sale of his restaurants. He alleged that the defendants continued to use the "RUGGLES GREEN" trademark and domain name without authorization, causing consumer confusion.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed all of Molzan's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court found that Molzan's allegations were conclusory and did not establish a connection between the defendants and the third-party websites causing the confusion. The court also determined that the Settlement Agreement between the parties addressed the alleged infringements and provided a remedy for such transgressions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that Molzan's complaint contained well-pleaded factual allegations that made his claims facially plausible. The court noted that the allegations established a likelihood of confusion due to the defendants' continued use of the "RUGGLES" trademarks. The court also found that the district court erred in assuming the veracity of the defendants' assertions over Molzan's well-pleaded allegations. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Molzan's federal and state trademark infringement, false advertising, unfair competition, and state trademark dilution claims. The court also reversed the dismissal of Molzan's breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. Additionally, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of the Web Defendants and the denial of Molzan's motion for leave to amend his complaint. View "Molzan v. Bellagreen Holdings" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Marco Destin, Inc., 1000 Highway 98 East Corp., E&T, Inc., and Panama Surf & Sport, Inc. (collectively, “Marco Destin”) filed a lawsuit against agents of L&L Wings, Inc. (“L&L”), alleging that a 2011 stipulated judgment in a trademark action was obtained through fraud. Marco Destin claimed that L&L had fraudulently procured a trademark registration from the USPTO, which was used to secure the judgment. They sought to vacate the 2011 judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3) and requested sanctions and damages.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. The court found that Marco Destin had a reasonable opportunity to uncover the alleged fraud during the initial litigation. Specifically, the court noted that the License Agreement between the parties indicated that other entities might have paramount rights to the "Wings" trademark, suggesting that Marco Destin could have discovered the fraud with due diligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal for abuse of discretion. The appellate court confirmed that the district court acted within its discretion in declining to vacate the 2011 stipulated judgment. The court emphasized that Marco Destin had a reasonable opportunity to uncover the alleged fraud during the initial litigation and that equitable relief under Rule 60(d)(3) requires a showing of due diligence. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion that Marco Destin could have discovered the fraud through proper diligence.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding the dismissal of Marco Destin’s claims. View "Marco Destin, Inc. v. Levy" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a trademark application for "COLOGNE & COGNAC ENTERTAINMENT" by a hip-hop record label. The appellants, Bureau National Interprofessionnel du Cognac and Institut National des Appellations d’Origine, are responsible for controlling and protecting the certification mark "COGNAC" for brandy from the Cognac region of France. They opposed the trademark application, arguing that it would likely cause confusion and dilute their certification mark.The United States Patent and Trademark Office's Trademark Trial and Appeal Board dismissed the opposition. The Board found that the "COLOGNE & COGNAC ENTERTAINMENT" mark, when used for hip-hop music and production services, was not likely to cause confusion or dilute the "COGNAC" certification mark. The Board concluded that the marks were dissimilar in connotation and commercial impression, and that the relevant goods, services, trade channels, and purchasers did not overlap. The Board also found that the appellants had not proven the fame of the "COGNAC" mark for purposes of dilution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the Board's decision. The court found that the Board applied an incorrect legal standard for determining the fame of the "COGNAC" mark and improperly discounted relevant evidence. The court also found that the Board erred in its analysis of the similarity of the marks and the relatedness of the goods, services, and trade channels. Additionally, the court concluded that the appellants had sufficiently pleaded their dilution claim. The case was remanded for reconsideration of the likelihood of confusion and dilution issues. View "BUREAU NATIONAL INTERPROFESSIONNEL DU COGNAC v. COLOGNE & COGNAC ENTERTAINMENT" on Justia Law

D'Pergo Custom Guitars, Inc. sued Sweetwater Sound, Inc. for using a photo of D'Pergo's guitar necks on Sweetwater's website. D'Pergo claimed copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, and a violation of the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The district court granted summary judgment to Sweetwater on the trademark claim and to D'Pergo on the copyright claim. A bench trial found in favor of Sweetwater on the CPA claim, and a jury awarded D'Pergo approximately $75,000 in compensatory damages for the copyright claim but did not award any of Sweetwater's profits.D'Pergo appealed the district court's summary judgment on the trademark claim and the bench trial ruling on the CPA claim. D'Pergo also argued that erroneous jury instructions warranted a reversal of the jury's finding that it was not entitled to recover any of Sweetwater's profits. Sweetwater cross-appealed, challenging the copyright damages based on what it claimed was inadmissible expert testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling in favor of Sweetwater on the CPA claim, finding that Sweetwater did not act with the intent required for a CPA violation. However, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Sweetwater on the trademark claim, concluding that D'Pergo's evidence created a genuine issue of fact regarding the trademark's secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion.The court also remanded for a new jury trial on the issue of infringing profits for the copyright claim, finding that the district court's jury instruction on the burden of proof for infringing profits overstated D'Pergo's burden. The court affirmed the district court's refusal to give D'Pergo's proposed "commingling" instruction and upheld the actual damages awarded to D'Pergo, rejecting Sweetwater's challenge to the admissibility of the expert testimony. View "D'Pergo Custom Guitars, Inc. v. Sweetwater Sound, Inc." on Justia Law

Lontex Corporation, a small Pennsylvania business, holds a registered trademark for “Cool Compression” used in its athletic compression apparel. Lontex sued Nike, Inc. for trademark infringement after discovering Nike's use of the phrase “Cool Compression” in its product names and marketing materials. Nike had rebranded a line of its athletic clothing as “Nike Pro” and used the phrase “Cool Compression” in product names on its website and catalogs. Lontex sent a cease-and-desist letter to Nike in 2016, but Nike continued using the phrase for some time.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held a trial where the jury found Nike liable for willful trademark infringement and contributory infringement, awarding Lontex $142,000 in compensatory damages and $365,000 in punitive damages. The District Court also trebled the compensatory damages to $426,000 and awarded Lontex nearly $5 million in attorney’s fees, deeming the case “exceptional” under the Lanham Act. Nike appealed the findings and the damages awarded, while Lontex cross-appealed the dismissal of its counterfeiting claim and the denial of profit disgorgement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s findings on trademark infringement, willfulness, and the trebling of damages. The Court held that a reasonable jury could find Nike’s continued use of “Cool Compression” after receiving the cease-and-desist letter as willful infringement. However, the Court vacated the award of attorney’s fees, finding that the District Court relied on broad policy considerations rather than specific facts of the case. The Court remanded the issue of attorney’s fees for further proceedings. The Court also upheld the dismissal of Lontex’s counterfeiting claim and the denial of profit disgorgement. View "Lontex Corp v. Nike Inc" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Gibson, Inc., a Delaware corporation, and Armadillo Distribution Enterprises, Inc., a Florida corporation, along with Concordia Investment Partners, L.L.C. Gibson, a well-known guitar manufacturer, brought trademark-infringement and counterfeiting claims against Armadillo and Concordia, alleging that they infringed on Gibson's trademarked guitar body shapes, headstock shape, and word marks. After a ten-day trial, the jury found in favor of Gibson on several counts of infringement and counterfeiting but also found that the doctrine of laches applied to limit Gibson’s recovery of damages.The district court had excluded decades of third-party-use evidence that Armadillo and Concordia submitted in support of their genericness defense and counterclaim. Armadillo and Concordia appealed this exclusion order, arguing that the evidence was relevant to their defense that Gibson's trademarks were generic and thus not entitled to protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court abused its discretion by excluding all pre-1992 third-party-use evidence without examining its possible relevance. The court noted that third-party-use evidence is often relevant to show the genericness of a mark, and a mark that is generic is not entitled to trademark protection. The court concluded that the district court's error affected Armadillo’s substantial rights to put on its primary defense to the infringement and counterfeiting claims against it. Therefore, the court remanded the case for a new trial. View "Gibson, Inc. v. Armadillo Distribution Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involves a trademark infringement dispute between BillFloat Inc., a Delaware corporation using the "SmartBiz" trademark, and Collins Cash Inc., a New York corporation using the "Smart Business Funding" mark. BillFloat alleged that Collins Cash, its former business partner, infringed on its trademark.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The district court admitted Collins Cash's likelihood-of-confusion survey as expert evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. After a jury trial, the court ruled in favor of Collins Cash, finding no likelihood of confusion between the marks. The district court also partially denied Collins Cash's motion for attorneys' fees.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Collins Cash's likelihood-of-confusion survey as expert evidence. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the jury that it should not draw any inferences from BillFloat's lack of a similar survey. On cross-appeal, the appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Collins Cash's motion for attorneys' fees for the trademark infringement claim, either under the parties' partnership agreement or under the Lanham Act. The court concluded that the trademark claim did not relate to the partnership agreement, and the case was not "exceptional" under the Lanham Act. View "BILLFLOAT INC. V. COLLINS CASH INC." on Justia Law

The case involves a trademark dispute between two appliance companies, Appliance Liquidation Outlet, L.L.C. (ALO) and Axis Supply Corporation (Axis). ALO had been operating under its name for over two decades when Axis opened a store in 2021, using a large banner with the words “Appliance Liquidation.” ALO claimed that this led to confusion among customers who believed ALO operated both stores. When Axis refused to change its name, ALO sued for trademark infringement.The district court found that ALO had valid trademarks in the words “Appliance Liquidation Outlet” and “Appliance Liquidation,” and that Axis’s banner infringed those marks. The court ruled in favor of ALO, prohibiting Axis from using ALO’s marks or causing confusion with ALO’s brand, and awarded ALO attorney’s fees.Axis appealed, arguing that the marks were not valid, its banner did not infringe those marks, and the district court erred in awarding ALO attorney’s fees. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed in part, finding that the district court erred in ruling that “Appliance Liquidation” is a valid trademark, but did not err in finding that “Appliance Liquidation Outlet” is a valid mark that Axis’s banner infringed. The court reversed the judgment as to the “Appliance Liquidation” mark, affirmed as to the “Appliance Liquidation Outlet” mark, and vacated the fee award. View "Appliance v. Axis Supply" on Justia Law