Justia Trademark Opinion Summaries

DACo, a sports specialty shop, sells souvenirs and apparel associated with Detroit professional sports teams. Since at least 2004, DACo has used the DETROIT ATHLETIC CO. mark in connection with its retail services. In 2015, DACo sought to register the standard character mark DETROIT ATHLETIC CO. on the Principal Register for “[o]n-line retail consignment stores featuring sports team related clothing and apparel; [r]etail apparel stores; [r]etail shops featuring sports team related clothing and apparel; [r]etail sports team related clothing and apparel stores.” In response to a non-final refusal, DACo disclaimed ATHLETIC CO. and amended to seek registration on the Supplemental Register. The examining attorney refused registration under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(d), finding that DETROIT ATHLETIC CO. is likely to be confused with DETROIT ATHLETIC CLUB, which is on the Principal Register for “[c]lothing, namely athletic uniforms, coats, golf shirts, gym suits, hats, jackets, sweatpants, sweatshirts, polo shirts, and T-shirts,” and is owned by the Detroit Athletic Club, a private social club organized in 1887. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Board balanced the DuPont factors; substantial evidence supports its finding that, “because the marks are similar, the goods and services are related, and the channels of trade and consumers overlap, . . . confusion is likely between Applicant’s mark DETROIT ATHLETIC CO. and the mark DETROIT ATHLETIC CLUB.” View "In re: Detroit Athletic Co." on Justia Law

Every winter for about 60 years, Tawas, Michigan has been the home of the “Perchville” festival, including a polar bear swim and a fishing contest. The Chamber of Commerce organizes the event and registered the name Perchville as a trademark. While dues-paying members of the Chamber may use the Perchville mark, non-members must pay a ($750) licensing fee to use it. A local company, AuSable, wants to make Perchville-branded tee-shirts, and sued the Chamber to invalidate its mark. The district court declined. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. “Perchville” is a distinctive term eligible for protection under the Lanham Act, which protects “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof” that a person uses “to identify and distinguish his or her goods” in the marketplace, 15 U.S.C. 1127. “No matter how you slice it, the term ‘Perchville’ is inherently distinctive. The name does not refer to a place. It serves only ‘to identify a particular’ event, namely the annual winter festival in Tawas. … The word almost certainly counts as fanciful, and at the very least is sufficiently suggestive to qualify as an inherently distinctive trademark.” View "AuSable River Trading Post v. Dovetail Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Diamond Hong petitioned for cancellation of Cai’s mark, “WU DANG TAI CHI GREEN TEA,” based on a likelihood of confusion with its registered TAI CHI mark. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) found a likelihood of confusion, giving limited consideration to Cai’s briefing because it contravened provisions of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure (TBMP). The Federal Circuit affirmed the cancellation of Cai’s mark under 15 U.S.C. 1052(d). The TBMP states that the TTAB is not required to permit “a party in the position of defendant” to file a reply brief. Diamond Hong initiated the cancellation proceedings by filing a petition;Cai was in the position of a defendant and was not entitled to file a reply brief. In its likelihood of confusion analysis, the TTAB considered the first three "DuPont factors," treating the rest as neutral because neither party submitted evidence related to them. Substantial evidence supports the TTAB’s findings with respect to each DuPont factor: the similarity of the nature of the goods, the similarity of established trade channels, and the similarity of the marks. View "Zheng Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc." on Justia Law

Alliance filed suit seeking to enjoin Coalition's use of its logo for federal trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Alliance and enjoined Coalition from using both its name and logo in political advertisements.The Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that Coalition failed to properly raise threshold questions concerning the applicability of the Lanham Act to what it characterized as political non-commercial speech. Therefore, the court declined to reach those questions. The court also held that the district court did not err in deciding that the birds on the logos at issue were identical. The panel held that the evidence established without dispute that Alliance's logo was a valid composite mark and that the use of Coalition's logo infringed Alliance's composite mark as a matter of law. The panel did modify the court's injunction in one respect, finding that the injunction restrained Coalition from using its name as well as its logo. Therefore, that aspect of the injunction was overbroad. View "Alliance for Good Government v. Coalition for Better Government" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment findings, evidentiary rulings, and denials of various motions on claims brought by a member of the rock band BOSTON against a former BOSTON guitarist alleging trademark infringement and breach of contract and on the guitarist’s counterclaims alleging breach of contract and abuse of process.Donald Thomas Scholz sued Barry Goudreau alleging claims related to impermissible inferences that Goudreau had allegedly made regarding his former association with BOSTON. Goudreau counterclaimed. After the district court granted in part the parties’ respective motions for summary judgment, the remaining claims proceeded to trial. The jury found in favor of the respective defendants on the remaining claims. The parties cross-appealed. The First Circuit affirmed the district court and denied the appeals, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion requiring reversal. View "Scholz v. Goudreau" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a dispute between a paleta company in Mexico (Prolacto) and a paleta company in northern California (PLM) over a phrase "La Michoacana" and an image of a girl in traditional dress holding a paleta ("Indian Girl"). At issue was whether Prolacto or PLM owned the contested phrase and image and which paleta company unfairly competed or otherwise infringed the other's trademark rights.The DC Circuit held that Prolacto's false-association claim failed because Prolacto failed to establish a right to the "La Michoacana" mark or injury from PLM's use sufficient to establish false association in violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment for PLM on that claim. The court also affirmed the district court's conclusion that Prolacto failed to establish that PLM's use of the Tocumbo Statements and other advertising materials constituted false advertising in violation of Prolacto's rights under section 43(a)(1)(B). Finally, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that Prolacto infringed PLM's use of its registered marks. The court found no merit in Prolacto's remaining arguments. View "Paleteria La Michoacana, Inc. v. Productos Lacteos Tocumbo S.A" on Justia Law

Bruce Munro and his studio appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint against Lucy and the denial of his motion to amend his complaint. Munro's claims stemmed from Lucy's "Light Forest" exhibition and advertising campaign that infringed on Munro's works. The Eighth Circuit affirm the district court's decision to dismiss Munro's trade dress, fraud, and tortious interference claims as well as its denial of Munro's motion to amend these claims because the proposed amendments were futile. The court held, however, that Munro sufficiently pleaded a trademark claim so as to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Munro v. Lucy Activewear, Inc." on Justia Law

Yellowfin filed suit against Barker Boatworks and Kevin Barker, alleging claims for trade dress infringement and false designation of origin under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, common law unfair competition, common law trade dress infringement, and violation of Florida's Uniform Trade Secret Act (FUTSA).The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. The court, weighing the likelihood of confusion factors holistically, held that the district court did not err in holding that Yellowfin could not, as a matter of law, prove a likelihood of confusion between Barker Boatworks' trade dress and its own. Therefore, the court held that the district court properly rejected the rest of Yellowfin's claims related to trade dress and consumer confusion. The court rejected Yellowfin's claims under FUTSA and held that Yellowfin failed to show that Barker allegedly misappropriated Source Information and Customer Information trade secrets. View "Yellowfin Yachts, Inc. v. Barker Boatworks, LLC" on Justia Law

Marcel filed suit against Lucky Brand under the Lanham Act for infringing on Marcel's "Get Lucky" trademark through its use of "Lucky" on its merchandise. Marcel also alleged that Lucky Brand did so in violation of an injunction entered in an earlier action between the parties. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Marcel released its claims through a 2003 settlement agreement that resolved an earlier substantially similar litigation between the parties. The Second Circuit vacated the judgment, holding that res judicata precluded Lucky Brand from raising its release defense in this case. The court held that under certain conditions parties may be barred by claim preclusion from litigating defenses that they could have asserted in an earlier action, and that the conditions here warranted application of that defense preclusion principle. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Marcel Fashions Group, Inc. v. Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in a trademark infringement action over the "Honey Badger" catchphrases under the Lanham Act. The panel applied the test in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), to balance the competing interests at stake when a trademark owner claims that an expressive work infringes on its trademark rights. The panel held that the Rogers test was not an automatic safe harbor for any minimally expressive work that copies someone else's mark. In this case, a jury could determine that defendants did not add any value protected by the First Amendment but merely appropriated the goodwill associated with plaintiff's mark. Defendants have not used another’s mark in the creation of a song, photograph, video game, or television show, but have largely just pasted plaintiff's mark into their greeting cards. Therefore, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc." on Justia Law