Justia Trademark Opinion Summaries

Trader Joe's filed suit against defendant for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq., and Washington law after defendant purchased Trader Joe's-branded goods in Washington state and transported them to Canada for resell in a store defendant designed to mimic a Trader Joe's store. The district court dismissed the Lanham Act and state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held, consistent with recent case law from the Supreme Court and this court, that the extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act raises a question relating to the merits of a trademark claim, not to federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction. The court concluded, on the merits, that Trader Joe’s alleges a nexus between defendant's conduct and American commerce sufficient to warrant extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act. Therefore, the court reversed as to the Lanham Act claim. The court affirmed the dismissal of the state law claims because Trader Joe’s did not allege trademark dilution in Washington or harm to a Washington resident or business. View "Trader Joe's Co. v. Hallatt" on Justia Law

In the 1980s, a wilderness guide, Maine developed and bottled an all-natural bug repellant under the mark “BUG OFF.” She did not conduct trademark searches. Maine sold BUG OFF at craft fairs, by catalog and website, and at trade shows. From 1992-1998, she took orders for BUG OFF from every state. In 1994, Smith & Hawken began carrying BUG OFF in its catalog and stores. In 1998 Chervitz, who later assigned to Kaz, filed an application for the BUG OFF trademark, which was registered in 2000. In 1999, Kaz sold millions of BUG OFF wristbands. In 2002, Maine sought to register the BUG OFF mark. The PTO refused, based on the Chervitz-Kaz registrations; Maine did not then assert pre-dating rights. In 2003, S.C. Johnson filed an intent-to-use application for the BUG OFF mark. Maine’s attorney communicated that she had used the mark since at least 1992. The PTO refused S.C. Johnson’s application. In 2007 Kaz assigned its rights to S.C. Johnson. In 2010, S.C. Johnson began using the mark. In 2011 Maine sold to Nutraceutical; S.C. Johnson’s application advanced to registration. S.C. Johnson sued Nutraceutical. Afte the bench trial, S.C. Johnson asserted that Nutraceutical had not shown continuous use after 2012. The court found that while Nutraceutical had proved that it was the senior user and was using the mark nationally from 1995-1998 and continued sales through 2012, it did “not demonstrate continued sales after 2012, which constitutes non-use for more than one year.” The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court abused its discretion in considering the post-trial argument. Trademark ownership is not acquired by registration, but from prior appropriation and actual use in the market. View "S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Nutraceutical Corp." on Justia Law

Diamond State Tire, Inc. (Diamond State) has been in business since 1989, and its customers and vendors often refer to it as Diamond Tire. Diamond Town Tire Pros & Auto Care LLC (Diamond Town) opened for business in 2015. Diamond State sued Diamond Town, alleging that Diamond Town violated Delaware’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act (the Act) by operating under a business name that creates a “likelihood of confusion” between the two businesses. The Court of Chancery entered judgment in favor of Diamond Town, concluding that Diamond State failed to demonstrate a violation of the Act. View "Diamond State Tire, Inc. v. Diamond Town Tire Pros & Auto Care, LLC" on Justia Law

SnoWizard and Southern Snow, sellers of flavored shaved ice confections, have been involved in litigation for the past ten years in state court, federal district court, and before the Patent and Trademark Office in the Federal Circuit. In this appeal, Southern Snow challenges the district court’s dismissal of its claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and SnoWizard cross-appeals the district court’s denial of its motions for sanctions against Southern Snow. Because the claims against SnoWizard are precluded, and because the claims against Morris and Tolar fail to satisfy the requirements for conspiracy, obstruction of justice, or malicious prosecution, the court affirmed the dismissal of all the claims. Given that Southern Snow advanced arguments that, although creative, were not “ridiculous,” the court affirmed the district court’s denials of sanctions. View "Snow Ingredients, Inc. v. SnoWizard, Inc." on Justia Law

EIP filed suit against PI, alleging claims related to the PAKSTER mark under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 119, 1120, and 1125(a). PI filed counterclaims for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act. The district court then issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. As relevant to this appeal, the district court cancelled PI’s two federal trademark registrations and found that EIP was the prevailing party. PI now appeals the grant of attorney's fees. The court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to cancel the federal registrations of PI’s trademarks, and vacated the cancellation. Having obtained no damages, injunction, or cancellation from its section 38 claim, there is no basis for concluding that EIP was the prevailing party on that claim, which EIP agrees is a precondition to receiving attorney’s fees. As a result, the court need not reach PI’s argument that attorney’s fees are not available under section 38 of the Lanham Act. The court also concluded that, because EIP was not the “prevailing party” with respect to PI’s trademark infringement and unfair competition counterclaims, it is not entitled to attorney’s fees under section 35 of the Lanham Act. Finally, the court remanded the case for further consideration of the issue of whether EIP should obtain attorney's fees because it successfully obtained a declaration that it owned the PAKSTER trademark. Accordingly, the court vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "East Iowa Plastics, Inc. v. PI, Inc." on Justia Law

Four years ago, the First Circuit affirmed a judgment that Defendant, a Puerto Rico credit union, infringed on the trademark rights of Plaintiff, a competing bank, by adopting a confusingly similar logo and trade dress. After the First Circuit remanded the case, the district court found no likelihood of confusion with respect to whether the credit union also infringed the bank’s word mark and trade name ORIENTAL with its competing marks COOP ORIENTAL, COOPERATIVA ORIENTAL, ORIENTAL POP, and CLUB DE ORIENTALITO. On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) there is no clear error in the district court’s conclusion that the CLUB DE ORIENTALITO mark was unlikely to cause consumer confusion; but (2) as to the COOP ORIENTAL, COOPERATIVA ORIENTAL, and ORIENTAL POP marks, the district court’s determination of non-infringement was clearly erroneous. View "Oriental Fin. Group, Inc. v. Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito Oriental" on Justia Law

FIU filed suit against FNU for infringement of FIU’s trademarks, asserting six claims for relief: (1) federal trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114; (2) federal unfair competition, also under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a); (3) Florida trademark dilution and injury to business reputation, Fla. Stat. 495.151; (4) Florida trademark infringement, Fla. Stat. 495.131; (5) Florida common law trademark infringement and unfair competition; and (6) cancellation of State of Florida trademark registration, Fla. Stat. 495.101. The district court entered final judgment in favor of FNU and FIU timely appealed. The court concluded that it was more accurate and better to view the district court’s decision in this case as the entry of judgment after conducting a bench trial. The court affirmed the district court's denial of FIU’s federal trademark claim where the district court reasonably concluded that FNU’s adoption of its new name and acronym did not and would not likely cause consumer confusion; FIU's federal unfair competition claim and false association theory of liability fail; the court affirmed the district court’s denial of its dilution claim for the same reasons as the likelihood of confusion claim; and the court affirmed the district court's denial of the Florida trademark infringement, common law infringement, and unfair competition claim as well. View "FIU v. FNU" on Justia Law

The mark “Crazy Horse” has been associated with adult entertainment since the 1950's. In this appeal, at issue is whether Russell Road’s use of the mark “Crazy Horse III” for its Las Vegas strip club infringes defendants Frank Spencer and Crazy Horse Consulting’s rights to the trademark “Crazy Horse.” The district court granted summary judgment to Russell Road. The court agreed with the district court that Russell Road has the right to use the mark because it is the assignee of a valid trademark co-existence agreement entered into with the former owner of the registered Crazy Horse mark. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Russell Road Food & Beverage v. Spencer" on Justia Law

Slep-Tone has filed more than 150 suits under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051, challenging the unauthorized copying and performance of its commercial karaoke files. In addition to the registered Sound Choice trademark, Slep-Tone claims ownership of distinctive trade dress, consisting of typeface, style, and visual arrangement of the song lyrics displayed in the graphic component of the accompaniment tracks; a display version of the Sound Choice mark; and the style of entry cues that are displayed to signal when singers should begin to sing. Slep-Tone alleges that it has used this trade dress for decades and that it is sufficiently recognizable to enable customers to distinguish a Slep-Tone track from a track produced by a competitor. The pub operators own hard drives containing allegedly illegitimate “bootleg” copies of Slep-Tone tracks and, allegedly, are improperly “passing off” the copies as genuine Slep-Tone tracks. The district court dismissed claims of trademark infringement, reasoning that the complaint did not plausibly suggest that the unauthorized use of Slep-Tone’s trademark and trade dress is likely to cause confusion among customers as to the source of any tangible good containing the tracks, a prerequisite to relief under either cited section of the Lanham Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Slep-Tone’s real complaint concerns theft, piracy, and violation of Slep-Tone’s media policy rather than trademark infringement. View "Phoenix Ent. Partners, LLC v. Rumsey" on Justia Law

JL Beverage filed suit against Jim Beam, alleging trademark infringement, false designation of origin, and unfair competition. The district court granted summary judgment for Jim Beam. In its summary judgment ruling, the district court used the standard applicable to preliminary injunctions instead of the standard for summary judgment rulings. Balancing the Sleekcraft factors as a whole, the court concluded that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to the likelihood of consumer confusion. In this case, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that: the JLV Mark has conceptual strength because the Mark’s salient feature, the color-coordinated lips, requires consumers to use their imagination to connect the color to the vodka flavor; the Lips Mark has conceptual strength because the lips have no commonly understood connection to the vodka product; Johnny Love Vodka does or does not have commercial strength (because a finding of either would support one of JL Beverage’s theories of confusion–reverse or forward); Johnny Love and Pucker Vodka are related flavored-liquor products sold to the same customers and distributors; the products are similar given their use of color-coordinated, puckered human lips as the focal point of their bottle designs; consumers purchasing the vodka products are not likely to exercise a high degree of care in distinguishing between the two; and Jim Beam was aware of JL Beverage’s trademarks prior to rolling out its Pucker Vodka line. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "JL Beverage v. Jim Beam Brands" on Justia Law