Justia Trademark Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and her companies, Tri-Serve and Capital Concepts, brought a claim for improper use of trade name and false designation of origin under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125, against Sheakley Entity Defendants on the basis of e-mails and mailings Angelia Strunk-Zwick, a manager for plaintiffs and a consultant for Defendant Sheakley HR Solutions, sent to Tri-Serve clients. The court concluded that plaintiffs have stated a claim for improper use of trade name and false designation of origin for which the Sheakley Entity Defendants may be held vicariously liable. Taken together, the representations at issue could not only sow confusion but also strongly imply affiliation - and affiliation not endorsed by plaintiffs. Because the Sheakley Entity Defendants may be held vicariously liable for Strunk-Zwick’s e-mail, plaintiffs have stated a claim for false advertising against Strunk-Zwick and the Sheakley Entity Defendants. Plaintiffs further allege that Strunk-Zwick and all Sheakley Defendants violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962, for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that plaintiffs’ RICO conspiracy claim fails because plaintiffs failed to allege a substantive RICO violation in the first place. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Lanham Act claims for failure to state a claim; affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' RICO claims; and remanded for further proceedings where the district court may, in its discretion, reexamine whether to reinstate any of plaintiffs' state law claims. View "Grubbs v. Sheakley Group, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2012 Navajo Nation sued for trademark infringement, alleging that Urban Outfitters “advertised, promoted, and sold goods under the ‘Navaho’ and ‘Navajo’ names and marks” on the Internet and in retail stores “[s]ince at least March 16, 2009.” Urban Outfitters tendered the complaint to its insurers. OneBeacon provided commercial general and umbrella liability coverage to Urban Outfitters until July 7, 2010, with “personal and advertising injury” coverage. On July 7, 2010, Hanover became the responsible insurer under a “fronting policy.” On July 7, 2011 Hanover issued separate commercial general liability and umbrella liability policies to Urban Outfitters. The “fronting policy” and Hanover-issued policies excluded coverage for “personal and advertising injury” liability “arising out of oral or written publication of material whose first publication took place before the beginning of the policy period.” After providing a reservation of rights letter, informing Urban Outfitters of Hanover and OneBeacon’s joint retention of defense counsel, Hanover obtained a judicial a declaration that it was not responsible for defense or indemnification. The Third Circuit affirmed.The “prior publication” exclusion of liability insurance contracts prevents a company from obtaining ongoing insurance coverage for a continuing course of tortious conduct. Urban Outfitters engaged in similar liability-triggering behavior both before and during Hanover’s coverage period. View "Hanover Ins. Co v. Urban Outfitters Inc" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from an intellectual property dispute between two religious organizations. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendant is infringing its registered service marks in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114, and Florida law. The district court granted judgment for defendant. In the first appeal, the court reversed in part and remanded for reconsideration of whether the parties' marks are likely to be confused. The court was also critical of disparaging comments that the district judge made about the parties. On remand, the court concluded that the district court misapplied several factors in its analysis of likely confusion, incorrectly assessed the Florida Priory’s defense of prior use, relied on historical testimony that the court previously deemed inadmissible, and misinterpreted the court's instructions about consulting facts outside the record. The court declined to order reassignment after balancing the three factors in United States v. Torkington. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Sovereign Military Hospitaller v. The Florida Priory of the Knights Hospitallers" on Justia Law

DC filed suit against defendant, producer of replicas of the Batmobile, alleging, among other things, causes of action for copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and unfair competition arising from defendant’s manufacture and sale of the Batmobile replicas. The court concluded that the Batmobile, as it appears in the comic books, television series, and motion picture, is entitled to copyright protection. The court also concluded that the Batmobile character is the property of DC and that defendant infringed upon DC’s property rights when he produced unauthorized derivative works of the Batmobile as it appeared in the 1966 television show and the 1989 motion picture. Finally, the district court did not err when it ruled as a matter of law that defendant could not assert a laches defense to DC's trademark infringement claim because defendant willfully infringed on DC's trademarks. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for DC on the copyright and trademark infringement claims. View "DC Comics v. Towle" on Justia Law

B&B, manufacturer and seller of "Sealtight," sued Hargis, manufacturer of "Sealtite," claiming trademark infringement and unfair competition. Hargis counterclaimed for false advertising and false designation of origin. The jury rejected B&B's claims but found in favor of Hargis on its counterclaims. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court properly refused to apply collateral estoppel to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's (TTAB) decision concerning likelihood of confusion; rejected B&B's argument that the TTAB's factual findings from a trademark registration case were entitled to deference; and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the TTAB's decision from the evidence presented to the jury. On remand from the Supreme Court the Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the ordinary elements of issue preclusion were met, and the usages of the mark adjudicated before TTAB were materially the same as the usages before the district court. On remand, the district court should give preclusive effect to the decision of the TTAB on likelihood of confusion. View "B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

The parties in these consolidated appeals are involved in a decade-long dispute regarding the TESTMASTERS trademark. The district court granted both parties’ motions for summary judgment, denying nationwide registration to both. Before the court is another appeal from a different district court's order finding one of the parties and his attorney to be in contempt, and ordering the attorney to be briefly jailed. The court vacated the contempt findings as to the Daniel Sheehan, concluding that there was no clear and convincing evidence upon which to find that Sheehan violated the injunction’s requirements. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Test Masters Educ. Serv., Inc. v. Robin Singh Educ. Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Norbero Colon Lorenzana (Colon) was working for South American Restaurant Corporation (SARCO), a franchisee and operator of Church’s Chicken locations in Puerto Rico, when he suggested to his superiors the concept for a new chicken sandwich that could be included on Church’s menu. Church’s subsequently began selling the item, which it called the “Pechu Sandwich.” SARCO subsequently received a certificate of registration from the Puerto Rico Department of State trademarking the name “Pechu Sandwich” and also received a federal trademark registration for the name “Pechusandwich.” Colon brought suit alleging violations of the Lanham Act and Copyright Act. SARCO filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which the district court granted. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly determined that neither the name “Pechu Sandwich” nor the recipe are eligible for copyright protection; and (2) that Colon failed to sufficiently plead that SARCO committed fraud in the procurement of a federal trademark for the Pechu Sandwich. View "Colon-Lorenzana v. South American Restaurants Corp." on Justia Law

Wolfskin applied to the Patent and Trademark Office to register a design mark consisting of an angled paw print for use with its clothing, footwear, and accessory products. New Millennium opposed the registration on the ground that Wolfskin’s mark would likely create confusion with its own registered mark. In response, Wolfskin filed a counterclaim for cancellation, alleging that New Millennium had abandoned its registered mark. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board rejected Wolfskin’s cancellation counterclaim and sustained the opposition, refusing to register Wolfskin’s mark. The Federal Circuit agreed that New Millennium did not abandon its registered mark, but held that the Board incorrectly found a likelihood of confusion between the two marks because the Board failed to properly compare New Millennium’s mark as a whole to Wolfskin’s mark and failed to recognize, in light of the significant evidence of paw prints appearing in third-party registrations and usage for clothing, the relatively narrow scope of protection afforded to marks involving paw prints. View "Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung fur Draussen GmbH & Co., KGAA, v. New Millenium Sports, S.L.U." on Justia Law

Louisiana Fish Fry filed a use-based application with the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) for the mark LOUISIANA FISH FRY PRODUCTS BRING THE TASTE OF LOUISIANA HOME!, and a design, identifying the following goods for the mark: “Marinade; Sauce mixes, namely barbecue shrimp sauce mix; Remoulade dressing; Cocktail sauce, Seafood sauce; Tartar sauce; Gumbo file; and Cayenne pepper.” The Examining Attorney refused to register the mark absent a disclaimer of FISH FRY PRODUCTS on the basis that the term is not independently registrable. Louisiana Fish Fry argued that a disclaimer of FISH FRY PRODUCTS was not necessary because the term was not generic and had acquired distinctiveness. It submitted evidence that Louisiana Fish Fry had been using LOUISIANA FISH FRY PRODUCTS for at least 30 years. Citing numerous articles and recipes, the Examining Attorney asserted that the relevant public understands “fish fry” to identify fried fish meals and that FISH FRY PRODUCTS is, at least, “highly descriptive.” The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board agreed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that Louisiana Fish Fry has not established that FISH FRY PRODUCTS has acquired distinctiveness. View "In re: Louisiana Fish Fry Prods., Ltd." on Justia Law

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) creates and assigns top level domains (TLDs), such as “.com” and “.net.” Plaintiff, a registry specializing in “expressive” TLDs, filed suit alleging that the 2012 Application Round for the creation of new TLDs violated federal and California law. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court rejected plaintiff's claims for conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, because plaintiff failed to allege an anticompetitive agreement; the court rejected plaintiff's claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, because ICANN’s authority was lawfully obtained through a contract with the DOC and did not unlawfully acquire or maintain its monopoly; the trademark and unfair competition claims were not ripe for adjudication because plaintiff has not alleged that ICANN has delegated or intends to delegate any of the TLDs that plaintiff uses; and the complaint failed to allege a claim for tortious interference or unfair business practice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "name.space, Inc. V. ICANN" on Justia Law