Justia Trademark Opinion Summaries

In 2001, ASC and Paragon entered into a contract to develop and support computer software for the Chicago Tribune. This software, called the “Single Copy Distribution System” (SCDS) would allow the Tribune to manage and track newspaper deliveries and subscriptions. Tensions emerged and Paragon terminated the contract in 2003. ASC successfully sued Paragon in Ohio state court, obtaining a declaration that ASC was the sole owner of the SCDS. In federal court, ASC alleged copyright infringement, trademark infringement, breach of contract, conversion, tortious interference with a business relationship, unjust enrichment, and unfair competition based on Paragon’s alleged copying of the SCDS software to use in its DRACI software, developed in 2004 for another newspaper. After eight years of litigation, the district court granted summary judgment to Paragon on all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that ASC had never submitted any evidence identifying the unique protectable elements of SCDS, and that there was insufficient evidence to generate even an implication that DRACI is substantially similar to SCDS. View "Automated Solutions Corp. v. Paragon Data Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

McAirlaids filed suit against Kimberly-Clark for trade-dress infringement and unfair competition under section 32(1)(a) and 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. 1114(1)(a) and 1125(a), and Virginia law. McAirlaids produces "airlaid," a textile-like material composed of cellulose fiber. McAirlaids fuses shredded cellulose fiber ("fluff pulp") through a patented embossing process that produces a "pixel" pattern for its absorbent products. McAirlaids filed suit against Kimberly-Clark after Kimberly-Clark began using a similar dot pattern on its GoodNites bed mates, an absorbent product manufactured in a manner different from McAirlaid's pads. On appeal, McAirlaids appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Kimberly-Clark. The court concluded that McAirlaids has presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the functionality of its pixel-pattern. In particular, deciding whether McAirlaid's embossing pattern affects the quality of its pads requires weighing evidence and making credibility determinations. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp." on Justia Law

Wisconsin’s Door Peninsula Winery began selling a spiced apple wine called “Hallowine” in 1998. Sales were brisk, and Door Peninsula expanded operations to Illinois later that year. Illinois River Winery began selling its own Hallowine in 2005 and sought to register the Hallowine mark in 2006. Door Peninsula initiated opposition proceedings at the PTO. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ruled in its favor, finding that Door Peninsula had priority in the Hallowine mark. Illinois River continued to sell its Hallowine despite the ruling. Door Peninsula filed suit in 2012, asserting infringement of its common law trademark rights and infringement of unregistered marks under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Illinois River asserted 27 affirmative defenses. The district court granted summary judgment, dismissing Illinois River’s affirmative defenses and a finding that Illinois River was liable for trademark infringement damages in the amount of $508,864.26. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Illinois River only raised arguments that were not before the district court. View "C&N Corp. v. Kane" on Justia Law

Nordic sought trademark registration for CHILDREN’S DHA for nutritional supplements. Nordic agreed to disclaim the exclusive use of “DHA” apart from use in the mark as a whole and clarified that the goods at issue are “designed for use by children.” The examiner rejected the mark as generic, or alternatively, as lacking acquired distinctiveness. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board found that the relevant goods were adequately defined by Nordic’s description: “nutritional supplements containing DHA” and that the relevant public for these goods “consists of parents or other adults seeking nutritional supplements containing DHA for children.” Citing dictionary definitions of “child” and “DHA,” the Board concluded that “children’s DHA” merely described an essential fatty acid for children, without indicating a source. The record also included third-party uses of “children’s DHA” both to describe DHA products for children in general and children’s DHA products other than Nordic’s. the Board concluded that children’s DHA “is the generic name for nutritional supplements containing DHA inasmuch as this wording encompasses nutritional supplements containing DHA formulated for children.” In the alternative, if the mark was not generic, the Board found that although Nordic has enjoyed commercial success with its products bearing the children’s DHA label, the mark was not acting as a source identifier and had not acquired distinctiveness. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "In re: Nordic Naturals, Inc." on Justia Law

Cubatabaco, a Cuban entity, and General, a Delaware company, manufacture and distribute cigars using the COHIBA mark. General owns trademark registrations issued in 1981 and 1995. Cubatabaco owns the mark in Cuba and uses it worldwide. Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), prohibit Cubatabaco from selling cigars in the U.S.; 31 C.F.R. 515.201(b) prohibits “transfer of property rights . . . to a Cuban entity,” but a general or specific license allows Cuban entities to engage in otherwise prohibited transactions. General licenses are available for transactions “related to the registration and renewal” of U.S. trademark. Specific licenses issue from the Office of Foreign Assets Control. Cubatabaco used a general license to attempt to register the COHIBA mark in 1997, relying on 15 U.S.C. 1126(e), which allows reliance on a foreign registration if the applicant has a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce. Cubatabaco also sought to cancel General’s registrations, which the PTO cited as a basis for likelihood of confusion. Cubatabaco obtained a special license to sue General. The district court held that General had abandoned its registration by non-use and enjoined General’s use of the COHIBA mark, finding that Cubatabaco had acquired ownership under the famous marks doctrine. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that injunctive relief would involve a prohibited transfer under CACR because Cubatabaco would acquire ownership of the mark and later affirmed denial of General’s motion concerning cancellation of its registrations. The Board then dismissed Cubatabaco’s petition, stating that it need not address preclusion because Cubatabaco lacked standing. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that Cubatabaco has a statutory cause of action to petition to cancel the registrations and that issue and claim preclusion do not bar that petition View "Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. General Cigar Co., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2010, Geller and Spence filed an intent-to-use application to register the mark STOP THE ISLAMISATION OF AMERICA in connection with “[p]roviding information regarding understanding and preventing terrorism.” The Examining Attorney refused the application on the ground that the mark may be disparaging to American Muslims under the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(a). The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed, considering the likely meaning of the mark, and determining that meaning was likely to disparage “a substantial composite of the referenced group.” The Board found the term “Islamisation,” as used in the mark, had two likely meanings: “the conversion or conformance to Islam” (religious meaning) and “a sectarianization of a political society through efforts to ‘make [it] subject to Islamic law’” (political meaning).The Board determined the mark may be disparaging to American Muslims under both meanings. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "In re: Geller" on Justia Law

PepperBall is a projectile ball filled with a pepper-spray-like irritant. Police departments, private security firms, and comparable organizations are its primary consumers. Advanced Tactical brought a trademark infringement claim against Real Action and its president, Tran. The district court granted a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Real Action, which preserved its objection. There was no evidence that Real Action had the necessary minimum contacts with Indiana to support specific jurisdiction. View "Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc." on Justia Law

BCN filed suit against Catalina and three of its individual officers or employees, alleging deceptive trade practices, trademark violations, and related fraud and tort claims. BCN's claims stemmed from defendants' creation of CouponNetwork.com, a website and business "remarkably similar" to BCN's existing business, BrandCouponNetwork.com. The court vacated the district court's judgment to the extent that it dismissed BCN's claims under Rule 12(b)(6) as time barred because the district court erred in considering evidence outside the pleadings and a genuine issue of material fact appeared to exist regarding the timeliness of BCN's claims which would preclude summary judgment. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the individual defendants where BCN failed to preserve its claims where BCN did not present it to the district court and BCN's claims were conclusional. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Brand Coupon Network, L.L.C. v. Catalina Marketing Corp., et al." on Justia Law

In the 1990s, Specht founded Android Data Corporation, and registered the “Android Data” trademark. The company ceased principal operations in 2002, but the mark remained registered to it. Five years later, Google Inc. introduced its new Android operating system for mobile phones. Specht sued for infringement. Google counterclaimed that Specht had abandoned the mark after 2002, forfeiting his ability to assert rights to it. The district court entered summary judgment for Google. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the undisputed evidence established that Specht abandoned the mark. View "Specht v. Google Inc." on Justia Law

New York based Stone Lion manages a hedge fund that focuses on credit opportunities. Lion, a United Kingdom private equity firm, invests primarily in companies that sell consumer products. Lion has two marks registered with the Patent and Trademark Office and started using the marks in the U.S. in 2005. Lion filed applications for “LION CAPITAL” and “LION” in 2005 and 2007, respectively, for services including “financial and investment planning and research,” “investment management services,” “capital investment consultation,” “equity capital investment,” and “venture capital services” Lion has priority over Stone Lion with respect to those marks. In August 2008, Stone Lion filed an intent-to-use application for the mark “STONE LION CAPITAL,” proposing to use the mark in connection with “financial services, namely investment advisory services, management of investment funds, and fund investment services.” Lion opposed the registration under section 2(d) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(d), alleging that the proposed mark would likely cause confusion with Lion’s registered marks when used for Stone Lion’s recited financial services. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board conducted the likelihood of confusion inquiry pursuant to 13 factors and refused registration. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the Board had substantial evidence to support its conclusion. View "Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital, LLP" on Justia Law