Justia Trademark Opinion Summaries

Defendant sold home theater systems manufactured by Plaintiff, Bose Corporation, for use in the U.S. to customers abroad. Defendant, who was not an authorized reseller or distributor of Bose products, sold the systems across international markets to take advantage of high retail prices in other countries. Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant for breach of contract and trademark infringement, asserting that Defendant sold its American products in Australia without Plaintiff's consent even though he had signed a settlement agreement promising not to make such sales after he had made similar sales in Europe. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the settlement agreement was a valid contract; and (2) summary judgment on the trademark infringement claim was appropriate. View "Bose Corp. v. Ejaz" on Justia Law

Houston and the District of Columbia each sought to register an official seal as a trademark in connection with various governmental services, including commerce, tourism, business administration, and public utility services. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office refused their applications, citing Section 2(b) of the Lanham Act, which prohibits registration of a proposed trademark that consists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or other insignia of the United States, or of any state or municipality, or of any foreign nation, 15 U.S.C. 1052(b). The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board upheld the denials. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the Board correctly interpreted Section 2. View "In re: City of Houston" on Justia Law

Groeneveld sued Lubecore, claiming that Lubecore’s automotive grease pump is a “virtually identical” copy of Groeneveld’s automotive grease pump. The complaint asserted tradedress infringement in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), and violation of related federal and Ohio laws. The trade-dress claim went to the jury, which found for Groeneveld and awarded it $1,225,000 in damages. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that a company cannot use trade-dress law to protect its functional product design from competition with a “copycat” design made by another company where there is no reasonable likelihood that consumers would confuse the two companies’ products as emanating from a single source. Trademark law is designed to promote brand recognition, not to insulate product manufacturers from lawful competition. View "Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

BDI is the owner a design patent and the manufacturer of slippers known as SNOOZIES®. High Point manufactures and distributes the accused FUZZY BABBA® slippers, which are sold through various retailers, including Meijer, Sears, and WalMart. BDI sent High Point a cease and desist letter, asserting patent infringement. High Point sought a declaratory judgment. The district court held BDI’s asserted design patent invalid on summary judgment and dismissed BDI’s trade dress claims with prejudice. The Federal Circuit reversed. The district court applied the incorrect standard; a reasonable jury could, under the correct standard, find the patent not invalid based on functionality. On remand, the district court should weigh High Point’s notice of BDI’s trade dress claim and initial belief that its original complaint encompassed such a claim and the absence of apparent prejudice to High Point against the fact that BDI had always been in possession of the information added in the proposed amendments and could have asked to clarify its pleading sooner. View "High Point Design LLC v. Buyer's Direct, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant, Hotel Melia, Inc., operated the Hotel Melia in Ponce, Puerto Rico since at least the 1890s. Defendant, however, never registered the mark "Melia" with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Plaintiff held several registered marks using the name "Melia" since the late 1990s. In 2007, Plaintiff's parent company opened a hotel called "Gran Melia" approximately eighty miles from Ponce. Plaintiff filed a petition seeking to register the mark "Gran Melia." Defendant opposed Plaintiff's registration petition. Plaintiff then filed a complaint against Defendant, seeking a declaration that Plaintiff had the right to use the mark Melia throughout Puerto Rico. The district court entered summary judgment for Plaintiff, concluding that, with the exception of the city of Ponce, Plaintiff was entitled to exclusive use of the Melia mark throughout Puerto Rico. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's entry of summary judgment, holding that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the Hotel Melia and Gran Melia marks cannot co-exist in Puerto Rico without creating an impermissible likelihood of confusion among reasonable consumers. Remanded. View "Dorpan, S.L. v. Hotel Melia, Inc." on Justia Law

Med-Systems, Inc., sells its products under the federally registered trademark SinuCleanse and two similar marks. Water Pik, Inc., which traditionally sold oral irrigators and showerheads, registered the trademark SINUSENSE with the intention of selling sinus-irrigation devices under the brand name “SinuSense.” It sued Med-Systems seeking a declaratory judgment that its use of the SinuSense brand name did not infringe on any of Med-Systems’ marks. Med-Systems counterclaimed for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act. Ruling that the SinuSense brand was not likely to cause consumer confusion, the district court awarded summary judgment to Water Pik on the counterclaims and dismissed Water Pik’s declaratory-judgment claim as moot. Finding no error in the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Water Pik, Inc. v. Med-Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Green Day and others, alleging violations of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101 et seq., and the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq., because Green Day used plaintiff's illustration, "Scream Icon," in the video backdrop of its stage show. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Green Day on all claims and the grant of attorney's fees to Green Day under the Copyright Act. The court concluded that Green Day's use of the illustration was fair use under the Copyright Act where the purpose and character of the use was transformative and not overly commercial; the nature of the work included its status as a widely disseminated work of street art; Green Day's use of the work was not excessive in light of its transformative purpose; and Green Day's use did not affect the value of the piece or of plaintiff's artwork in general. In regards to plaintiff's claims under the Lanham Act, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish any trademark rights. The court concluded, however, that the district court clearly erred in finding that plaintiff's claims were objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment but vacated the award of attorneys fees. View "Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq., against defendants, alleging trademark infringement based on a theory that defendants misappropriated and have unauthorized commercial use in the United States of certain United States-registered trademarks related to "Stolichnaya" - brand vodka (the "Marks"). At issue on appeal was whether plaintiffs have sufficient claim to the Marks to sue for infringement under the Act. The court concluded that FTE was neither (1) the Russian Federation's "assign" of the marks nor (2) its "legal representative." The court also concluded that Cristall could not sue, since its rights as a plaintiff were purely derivative of those held by FTE, and FTE could not grant rights greater than its own; the court rejected plaintiffs' joint argument that they were entitled to proceed because the Russian Federation had "ratified" their suit; and, therefore, neither plaintiff was entitled to sue for infringement under section 1114(1). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Third Amended Complaint with prejudice. View "Fed. Treasury Enter. v. SPI Spirits Ltd." on Justia Law

Former starting quarterback for Arizona State University, Samuel Keller, filed a putative class action suit against EA, alleging that EA violated his right of publicity under California Civil Code 3344 and California common law by using Keller's likeness as part of the "NCAA Football" video game series. EA moved to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) under California's anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16. The court concluded that EA could not prevail as a matter of law based on the transformative use defense where EA's use did not qualify for First Amendment protection because it literally recreated Keller in the very setting in which he had achieved renown. The court also concluded that, although there was some overlap between the transformative use test and the Rogers v. Grimaldi test, the Rogers test should not be imported wholesale to the right-of-publicity claims. Finally, the court concluded that state law defenses for reporting of information did not protect EA's use. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to strike the complaint. View "In re: NCAA Licensing Litig." on Justia Law

Retired Hall of Fame football player, James "Jim" Brown, filed suit against EA, alleging that EA violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), through the use of Brown's likeness in EA's "Madden NFL" series of football video games. The court rejected the "likelihood of confusion" test and the "alternative means" test, concluding that the only relevant legal framework for balancing the public's right to be free from consumer confusion about Brown's affiliation with "Madden NFL" and EA's First Amendment rights in the context of Brown's section 43(a) claim was the Rogers v. Grimaldi test. Applying the Rogers test, the court concluded that the use of Brown's likeness was artistically relevant to the "Madden NFL" games and that there were no alleged facts to support the claim that EA explicitly mislead consumers as to Brown's involvement with the games. In this case, the public interest in free expression outweighed the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of EA's motion to dismiss. View "Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc." on Justia Law