Justia Trademark Opinion Summaries

DuoProSS and Inviro sell medical syringes designed to prevent accidental needle sticks. A person using an Inviro syringe: rotates the plunger; pulls the plunger back, drawing the needle into the syringe barrel; and snaps off the plunger, sealing the needle inside. Inviro owns the two trademarks at issue: the “SNAP! design mark,” for use with “ medical, hypodermic, aspiration and injection syringes” and the “SNAP SIMPLY SAFER mark,” for use with “cannulae; medical, hypodermic, aspiration and injection needles; medical, hypodermic, aspiration and injection syringes.” Inviro petitioned to cancel a trademark registration owned by DuoProSS for the design mark BAKSNAP, for use with a “safety syringe for medical use.” DuoProSS counterclaimed for cancellation of several Inviro registrations, including the marks at issue. Inviro withdrew its petition and agreed to voluntarily surrender one registration. The Board concluded that other registrations for the SNAP mark in typed format were merely descriptive and ordered cancellation, but declined to cancel the SNAP! design mark and the SNAP SIMPLY SAFER word mark. The Federal Circuit reversed. The Board failed to consider one of the marks as a whole, unduly focusing on one portion (!) and erroneously concluded that puffing could render the marks more than descriptive.View "Duopross Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med.Devices, Ltd." on Justia Law

Eureka Water Company contended that a 1975 agreement granted it the exclusive license in 60 Oklahoma counties to sell spring water and other products using the "Ozarka" trademark. It sued Nestle Waters North America, Inc., the current owner of the Ozarka trademark, to obtain a declaratory judgment of that right and to obtain monetary relief under several theories, including breach of contract, tortious interference with business relations, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel. A jury found for Eureka on its contract and tortious interference claims, and the district court entered a judgment declaring that the 1975 agreement granted Eureka the exclusive right that it claimed in the Ozarka mark. In a post-verdict ruling, the district court denied as duplicative Eureka's equitable claims based on unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel. Nestle appealed. The Tenth Circuit agreed with most of Nestle's principal arguments. First, the Court reversed the district court's denial of Nestle's motion for JMOL on the contract claim because the 1975 agreement unambiguously did not cover spring water and under Oklahoma contract law. The Court reversed the denial of JMOL on the tortious-interference claim because Eureka failed to show that Nestle's decision to charge Eureka what it charged other vendors for bottled water was not privileged or justified. Third, the Court affirmed the denial of Eureka's unjust enrichment claim because the claim is based on the false premise that Eureka's license to use the Ozarka trademark covers spring water. The Court reversed, however, the denial of Eureka's promissory-estoppel claim, and remanded that claim for further consideration by the district court. View "Eureka Water Company v. Nestle Waters North America" on Justia Law

In 1998, the U.S.PTO issued Registration 334 to WJ for the mark LENS in connection with “computer software featuring programs used for electronic ordering of contact lenses in the field of ophthalmology, optometry and opticianry.” In 2001, Lens.com, an online retailer of contact lenses applied for the mark LENS in connection with “retail store services featuring contact eyewear products rendered via a global computer network.” The PTO cited the 334 Registration as a bar based on likelihood of consumer confusion and refused registration of the mark as merely descriptive of services. In 2002, WJ assigned the registration to Lens.com, which withdrew its cancellation petition under a settlement agreement and obtained the 334 Registration for the mark LENS in connection with “computer software featuring programs used for electronic ordering of contact lenses in the field of ophthalmology, optometry and opticianry.” In 2008, 1-800 Contacts filed Cancellation 925 alleging that Lens.com abandoned or fraudulently obtained the mark LENS because Lens.com never sold or otherwise engaged in the trade of computer software. The Board granted summary judgment of abandonment on the ground that the software is merely incidental to sale of contact lenses, and is not a “good in trade,” solicited or purchased in the market for its intrinsic value.’” The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Lens.com, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc." on Justia Law

Flowers Bakeries Brands, Inc. brought suit against Interstate Bakeries Corporation (IBC) for trademark infringement, among other claims, alleging that IBC'S NATURE'S PRIDE and NATURE'S CHOICE trademarks in connection with packaged breads were confusingly similar to Flowers' NATURE'S OWN trademark. When OneBeacon Insurance Company, IBC's insurer, refused to defend IBC in the underlying lawsuit, IBC initiated this action seeking a declaration that OneBeacon had a duty to defend IBC. At issue was whether the trademarked phrase NATURE'S OWN was a title or slogan under IBC's advertising insurance policy with OneBecaon. The district court entered judgment in favor of OneBeacon. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that OneBeacon did not have a duty to defend IBC in the underlying litigation, as Flowers failed to allege facts that would indicate the phrase NATURE'S OWN was potentially a title or slogan under the policy. View "Interstate Bakeries Corp. v. OneBeacon Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Nestle’s BEGGIN’ STRIPS registered mark for pet treats has been in continuous use since 1988 and has been registered since 1989. Midwestern manufactures and sells pet treats and filed an intent-to-use application with the Patent and Trademark Office, seeking to register the mark WAGGIN’ STRIPS for pet food and edible pet treats. Nestle opposed registration, arguing likelihood of confusion between the two marks. The district court ruled in favor of Nestle, finding likelihood of confusion. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court properly admitted evidence submitted by Nestle. View "Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle, S.A." on Justia Law

In 1957, Dominic opened an Italian restaurant, “Dominic’s.” It closed in 2007, but daughter-in-law, Anne, continues to market “Dominic’s Foods of Dayton.” In 2007, Christie, a granddaughter, contracted to operate a restaurant with Powers and Lee, a former Dominic’s chef. In pre-opening publicity, they promised to bring back original Dominic’s recipes. They named the business “Dominic’s Restaurant, Inc.” and registered with the Ohio Secretary of State. Anne brought claims of trademark infringement, trademark dilution, unfair practices, unfair competition, tortious interference with contract, conversion, misappropriation of business property, breach of contract, fraudulent and/or negligent misrepresentation, and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court concluded that defendants had engaged in infringing behavior before and after entry of a TRO. Powers and Lee later closed the restaurant and withdrew registration of the name, but motions continued, arising out of efforts to open under another name. The district court eventually granted default judgment against defendants, rejecting a claim that proceedings were automatically stayed by Powers’ bankruptcy filing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The stay does not protect a debtor’s tortious use of his property and, while the stay would bar assessment of damages, it would not bar injunctive relief. View "Dominic's Rest. of Dayton, Inc. v. Mantia" on Justia Law

HSN sold through its website and television station about 70,000 "Esteban" guitars that it identified, inaccurately, as containing Fishman pickups. Esteban is the performance name used by musician Paul who, with his company Daystar, has collaborated with HSN since 2001 to market Esteban guitar packages. Fishman, manufacturer of the pickup at issue, which is attached to musical instruments for sound amplification, claimed trademark infringement and false advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.1051, against HSN, Paul, and Daystar. The district court rejected the claims, finding that the violations were not "willful." The judge chose not to order disgorgement of profits. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings and jury instructions. In federal civil litigation willfulness requires a conscious awareness of wrongdoing by the defendant or at least conduct deemed "objectively reckless" measured against standards of reasonable behavi View "Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. Paul" on Justia Law

In 2000, a fire destroyed a business location of Stone Flood and Fire Restoration Inc., spurring years of litigation with its insurer, Safeco Insurance Company of America. After Stone Flood and its two shareholders, James and Patrice Stone, sued Safeco in 2007, the district court dismissed all claims against Safeco. The court concluded (1) Stone Flood's claims on the insurance policy were filed three days beyond the applicable statute of limitations and were therefore barred; (2) the Stones were not insureds and lacked standing to bring individual claims under the policy; and (3) the Stones lacked standing to bring a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) because their alleged injuries were merely derivative of the corporation's. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court's calculation of the tolling of the limitations period was incorrect and a correct calculation saved Stone Flood's claims under the insurance policy; and (2) the district court properly concluded the Stones were not insureds and lacked standing to sue under the policy, and their claim of IIED failed for lack of a distinct, non-derivative injury. Remanded.View "Stone Flood & Fire Restoration, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellants filed suit against Rearden Commerce, asserting numerous claims related to a conflict between the parties' marks and names. The district court granted Rearden Commerce's motion for summary judgment as to Appellants' trademark-related claims. Specifically, the district court found Rearden Commerce was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Appellants' claims of false designation of origin under the Lanham Act, violations of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, common law trademark infringement, and violations of the California Unfair Competition Law. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed, which precluded summary judgment in favor of Rearden Commerce. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Rearden LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc." on Justia Law

Of the parties in this case, one of two competing car dealerships used a software program in order to compete more aggressively with the other one over the internet. The program produced a "multiplicity of mini-websites, a host of hard feelings, and of course, litigation." The mini-websites (or "microsites" would either automatically redirect users who clicked on them to Eastern Shore Toyota, LLC's official websites, or they would display a one-page website advertising Eastern Shore. Eastern Shore was sent numerous cease-and-desist letters for using any microsite address that infringed on another company's trademark. Eastern Shore blamed the person behind the creation of its microsite marketing strategy for its legal troubles with third parties. One such third party, Bob Tyler Toyota, filed suit against Eastern Shore's owner Shawn Esfahani and the "internet marketing expert" who first approached Eastern Shore with the microsite idea, David Vaughn, Jr. Bob Tyler Toyota brought six claims against Eastern Shore, seeking injunctive relief and actual and statutory damages, all relating to Eastern Shore's alleged misuse of its trademarks under state and federal law. The district court denied Bob Tyler Toyota's motion for summary judgment and its motion for judgment as a matter of law. The jury found that Eastern Shore violated at least one of Bob Tyler Toyota's six claims. At that time, Bob Tyler Toyota did not object to or even mention any inconsistencies between the jury's findings. A month after the verdict, Bob Tyler Toyota renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law on all of its claims. It also moved for a new trial on its anticybersquatting claim, arguing, among other things, that the jury verdict was inconsistent and that it was not supported by the evidence. The district court denied both motions. Bob Tyler Toyota appealed. In light of the totality of the evidence, the Eleventh Circuit could not say that the district court erred in denying Bob Tyler Toyota's motions or abused its discretion in determining the jury's verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision and jury verdict. View "Pensacola Motor Sales Inc. v. Eastern Shore Toyota" on Justia Law