Justia Trademark Opinion Summaries

Rosetta Stone appealed from an order granting summary judgment in favor of Google for Rosetta Stone's trademark infringement, contributory and vicarious trademark infringement, and trademark dilution claims. Rosetta Stone also appealed from an order dismissing its unjust enrichment claim under Virginia Law. Rosetta Stone contended that Google's policies concerning the use of trademarks as keywords and in ad text created not only a likelihood of confusion but also actual confusion, as well as misleading Internet users in purchasing counterfeit Rosetta Stone software. The court affirmed the district court's order with respect to the vicarious infringement claim and the unjust enrichment claims. The court vacated, however, the district court's order with respect to Rosetta Stone's direct infringement claim after addressing the likelihood of confusion and the functionality doctrine; contributory infringement claim where the evidence recited by the district court was sufficient to establish a question of fact as to whether Google continued to supply its services to known infringers; and dilution claim where the district court erred by omitting the question of good faith and collapsing the fair-use defense into one question. The court remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board found that a service mark, NATIONAL CHAMBER, submitted by the Chamber of Commerce of the USA, was correctly refused registration for being merely descriptive under 15 U.S.C. 1052(e)(1). The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding the decision supported by substantial evidence.View "In re: Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America" on Justia Law

This case involved the importation and sale of counterfeit luxury goods bearing trademarks owned by Louis Vuitton (plaintiff) and others. Defendants appealed from the district court's judgment granting summary judgment to plaintiff on its claims of trademark counterfeiting and infringement, and awarding plaintiff statutory damages in the amount of $3 million, and more than $500,000 in attorney's fees and costs. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to stay the proceedings; that, as the district court concluded, an award of attorney's fees under 15 U.S.C. 1117(a) could accompany an award of statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1117(c); and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding such fees or in setting their amount. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.View "Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

LE, creator of the “5-hour ENERGY” energy shot, asserted that N.V.E., creator of the “6 Hour POWER” energy shot, infringed its trademark, under the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. 125(a). LE distributed a “recall notice” stating that NVE’s “‘6 Hour’ energy shot” had been recalled. NVE claims that the notice constituted false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act and anti-competitive conduct in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2. The district court first found that a likelihood of confusion did not exist between “6 Hour POWER” and “5-hour ENERGY” and held that the recall notice did not constitute false advertising or a violation of the Sherman Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to trademark infringement and false advertising claims, but affirmed with respect to Sherman Act claims. The “5-hour ENERGY” mark is suggestive and protectable, but the factors concerning likelihood of confusion were closely balanced, making summary judgment in appropriate. There were also unresolved questions of fact as to whether the “recall notice” was misleading, but there was no Sherman Act violation because it was relatively simple for NVE to counter it by sending notices that “6 Hour POWER” had not been recalled. View "N.V.E., Inc. v. Innovation Ventures, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a religious order of the Roman Catholic Church that undertook charitable work internationally, filed suit against defendant, a charitable organization with an expressly ecumenical association, asserting infringement and false advertising claims under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq., as well as state law claims for unfair competition and violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), Fla. Stat. 501.201 et seq. The infringement claims were based on defendant's alleged use of marks that were confusingly similar to those for which plaintiff had obtained federal registrations. In the false advertising claim, plaintiff charged that defendant falsely claimed a historic affiliation with plaintiff going back to the eleventh century. The state law claims derived from these same litigations. Defendant counterclaimed, alleging that plaintiff committed fraud on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in applying for its service marks due to plaintiff's failure to disclose its knowledge of the domestic presence of other organizations that used similar marks in commerce. The court concluded that the district court clearly erred in evaluating the claim that plaintiff committed fraud on the PTO and reversed the cancellation of the four word marks. Because the court was not presented with sufficient findings to review the Lanham Act infringement claims, the court vacated the district court's ruling on that issue and remanded. The court vacated the district court's ruling on the state law claims and affirmed the district court's finding on the Lanham Act false advertising claim in favor of defendant. View "Sovereign Military Hospitaller v. Knights Hospitallers" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a recognized figure in aviation history and defendants are retired commercial airline captains who became friends with plaintiff in the 1980s. Defendants sell aviation-related memorabilia, including items related to or signed by plaintiff. In 2008, plaintiff brought claims against defendants, including violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq., California's common law right to privacy, and California's statutory right to publicity, Cal. Civ. Code 3344. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendants. Plaintiff contended that the district court should not have struck his declaration, which contained comprehensive details he did not remember at his deposition. He also contended that, under California's single-publication rule, defendants "republished" statements about him on their website - when they modified unrelated information on their website. The court rejected both arguments and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Yeager, et al v. Bowlin, et al" on Justia Law

Bridgestone registered the mark POTENZA for tires in 1984, stating use in commerce since 1981. Bridgestone registered the mark TURANZA for tires in 2004, stating use in commerce since 1991. Federal filed an intent-to-use application to register the mark MILANZA for tires in 2004. Bridgestone opposed registration, arguing likelihood of confusion. The Board gave little weight to survey evidence of consumer confusion as to the source of tires bearing the MILANZA mark, and held that the "dissimilarity of the marks simply outweighs the other relevant factors." The Federal Circuit reversed, noting the identity of the goods, the lengthy prior use of POTENZA and TURANZA, market strength of the POTENZA and TURANZA marks, and the similarities of words, sounds, and connotation with MILANZA. Sufficient similarity has been shown as would be likely to cause consumer confusion, deception, or mistake.View "Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC v. Federal Corp." on Justia Law

Suntree appealed from the district court's order denying its motion for summary judgment and granting the motions for summary judgment filed by Ecosense and George Dussich with regard to Suntree's claims of false designation of origin and false advertising under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051-1127, common law trademark infringement and unfair competition, and deceptive and unfair trade practices pursuant to the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUPTA), Fla. Stat. 501.201 et seq. Both Suntree and Ecosense manufacture baffle boxes, a filtration product. Suntree contended that the district court erred in concluding that Suntree failed to establish that Ecosense and Dussich directly or contributorily infringed on their trademark because it failed to present evidence of actual or of a likelihood of confusion. The court disagreed and affirmed the judgment. View "Suntree Technologies, Inc. v. Ecosense International, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Christian Louboutin, a fashion designer best known for his use of red lacquer on the outsole of the shoes he designs, appealed the district court's order denying a motion for preliminary injunction against alleged trademark infringement by Yves Saint Laurent (YSL). The court concluded that the district court's conclusion that a single color could never serve as a trademark in the fashion industry was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., and that the district court therefore erred by resting its denial of Louboutin's preliminary injunction motion on that ground. The court further concluded that Louboutin's trademark, consisting of a red, lacquered outsole on a high fashion woman's shoe, has acquired limited "secondary meaning" as a distinctive symbol that identified the Louboutin brand. Pursuant to Section 37 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1119, the court limited the trademark to uses in which the red outsole contrasted with the color of the remainder of the shoe. Because Louboutin sought to enjoin YSL from using a red sole as part of a monochrome red shoe, the court affirmed in part the order of the district court insofar as it declined to enjoin the use of the red lacquered outsoles in all situations. However, the court reversed in part the order of the district court insofar as it purported to deny trademark protection to Louboutin's use of contrasting red lacquered outsoles. View "Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America Inc." on Justia Law

Harley-Davidson had a licensing agreement with a subsidiary of DFS and received notice that the companies had merged. Harley-Davidson did not exercise its right to terminate, but later discovered that DFS had sold unauthorized products bearing the trademark to an unapproved German retailer. Harley-Davidon sent an e-mail saying that it believed DFS was in breach of contract and that it was suspending approval of products. DFS responded in kind. Harley-Davidson then attempted to recover unpaid royalties and to secure from DFS information required under the agreement. DFS refused these attempts, but submitted production samples for a new collection. Harley-Davidson reminded DFS of the termination. DFS advised Harley-Davidson that it had “wrongfully repudiated the License Agreement” and that DFS planned to act unilaterally in accordance with its own views of rights and obligations. The district court granted injunctive relief against DFS, which was attempting to litigate the dispute in Greece. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Harley-Davidson made strong showings that DFS was deliberately breaching a licensing agreement and “has tried numerous legal twists and contortions to try to avoid the legal consequences.” The court rejected an argument that the agreement provision consenting to personal jurisdiction in Wisconsin was not binding on DFS. View "H-D MI, LLC v. Hellenic Duty Free Shops, S.A." on Justia Law