Justia Trademark Opinion Summaries

In 1998, the U.S.PTO issued Registration 334 to WJ for the mark LENS in connection with “computer software featuring programs used for electronic ordering of contact lenses in the field of ophthalmology, optometry and opticianry.” In 2001, Lens.com, an online retailer of contact lenses applied for the mark LENS in connection with “retail store services featuring contact eyewear products rendered via a global computer network.” The PTO cited the 334 Registration as a bar based on likelihood of consumer confusion and refused registration of the mark as merely descriptive of services. In 2002, WJ assigned the registration to Lens.com, which withdrew its cancellation petition under a settlement agreement and obtained the 334 Registration for the mark LENS in connection with “computer software featuring programs used for electronic ordering of contact lenses in the field of ophthalmology, optometry and opticianry.” In 2008, 1-800 Contacts filed Cancellation 925 alleging that Lens.com abandoned or fraudulently obtained the mark LENS because Lens.com never sold or otherwise engaged in the trade of computer software. The Board granted summary judgment of abandonment on the ground that the software is merely incidental to sale of contact lenses, and is not a “good in trade,” solicited or purchased in the market for its intrinsic value.’” The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Lens.com, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc." on Justia Law

Flowers Bakeries Brands, Inc. brought suit against Interstate Bakeries Corporation (IBC) for trademark infringement, among other claims, alleging that IBC'S NATURE'S PRIDE and NATURE'S CHOICE trademarks in connection with packaged breads were confusingly similar to Flowers' NATURE'S OWN trademark. When OneBeacon Insurance Company, IBC's insurer, refused to defend IBC in the underlying lawsuit, IBC initiated this action seeking a declaration that OneBeacon had a duty to defend IBC. At issue was whether the trademarked phrase NATURE'S OWN was a title or slogan under IBC's advertising insurance policy with OneBecaon. The district court entered judgment in favor of OneBeacon. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that OneBeacon did not have a duty to defend IBC in the underlying litigation, as Flowers failed to allege facts that would indicate the phrase NATURE'S OWN was potentially a title or slogan under the policy. View "Interstate Bakeries Corp. v. OneBeacon Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Nestle’s BEGGIN’ STRIPS registered mark for pet treats has been in continuous use since 1988 and has been registered since 1989. Midwestern manufactures and sells pet treats and filed an intent-to-use application with the Patent and Trademark Office, seeking to register the mark WAGGIN’ STRIPS for pet food and edible pet treats. Nestle opposed registration, arguing likelihood of confusion between the two marks. The district court ruled in favor of Nestle, finding likelihood of confusion. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court properly admitted evidence submitted by Nestle. View "Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle, S.A." on Justia Law

In 1957, Dominic opened an Italian restaurant, “Dominic’s.” It closed in 2007, but daughter-in-law, Anne, continues to market “Dominic’s Foods of Dayton.” In 2007, Christie, a granddaughter, contracted to operate a restaurant with Powers and Lee, a former Dominic’s chef. In pre-opening publicity, they promised to bring back original Dominic’s recipes. They named the business “Dominic’s Restaurant, Inc.” and registered with the Ohio Secretary of State. Anne brought claims of trademark infringement, trademark dilution, unfair practices, unfair competition, tortious interference with contract, conversion, misappropriation of business property, breach of contract, fraudulent and/or negligent misrepresentation, and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court concluded that defendants had engaged in infringing behavior before and after entry of a TRO. Powers and Lee later closed the restaurant and withdrew registration of the name, but motions continued, arising out of efforts to open under another name. The district court eventually granted default judgment against defendants, rejecting a claim that proceedings were automatically stayed by Powers’ bankruptcy filing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The stay does not protect a debtor’s tortious use of his property and, while the stay would bar assessment of damages, it would not bar injunctive relief. View "Dominic's Rest. of Dayton, Inc. v. Mantia" on Justia Law

HSN sold through its website and television station about 70,000 "Esteban" guitars that it identified, inaccurately, as containing Fishman pickups. Esteban is the performance name used by musician Paul who, with his company Daystar, has collaborated with HSN since 2001 to market Esteban guitar packages. Fishman, manufacturer of the pickup at issue, which is attached to musical instruments for sound amplification, claimed trademark infringement and false advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.1051, against HSN, Paul, and Daystar. The district court rejected the claims, finding that the violations were not "willful." The judge chose not to order disgorgement of profits. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings and jury instructions. In federal civil litigation willfulness requires a conscious awareness of wrongdoing by the defendant or at least conduct deemed "objectively reckless" measured against standards of reasonable behavi View "Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. Paul" on Justia Law

In 2000, a fire destroyed a business location of Stone Flood and Fire Restoration Inc., spurring years of litigation with its insurer, Safeco Insurance Company of America. After Stone Flood and its two shareholders, James and Patrice Stone, sued Safeco in 2007, the district court dismissed all claims against Safeco. The court concluded (1) Stone Flood's claims on the insurance policy were filed three days beyond the applicable statute of limitations and were therefore barred; (2) the Stones were not insureds and lacked standing to bring individual claims under the policy; and (3) the Stones lacked standing to bring a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) because their alleged injuries were merely derivative of the corporation's. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court's calculation of the tolling of the limitations period was incorrect and a correct calculation saved Stone Flood's claims under the insurance policy; and (2) the district court properly concluded the Stones were not insureds and lacked standing to sue under the policy, and their claim of IIED failed for lack of a distinct, non-derivative injury. Remanded.View "Stone Flood & Fire Restoration, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellants filed suit against Rearden Commerce, asserting numerous claims related to a conflict between the parties' marks and names. The district court granted Rearden Commerce's motion for summary judgment as to Appellants' trademark-related claims. Specifically, the district court found Rearden Commerce was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Appellants' claims of false designation of origin under the Lanham Act, violations of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, common law trademark infringement, and violations of the California Unfair Competition Law. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed, which precluded summary judgment in favor of Rearden Commerce. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Rearden LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc." on Justia Law

Of the parties in this case, one of two competing car dealerships used a software program in order to compete more aggressively with the other one over the internet. The program produced a "multiplicity of mini-websites, a host of hard feelings, and of course, litigation." The mini-websites (or "microsites" would either automatically redirect users who clicked on them to Eastern Shore Toyota, LLC's official websites, or they would display a one-page website advertising Eastern Shore. Eastern Shore was sent numerous cease-and-desist letters for using any microsite address that infringed on another company's trademark. Eastern Shore blamed the person behind the creation of its microsite marketing strategy for its legal troubles with third parties. One such third party, Bob Tyler Toyota, filed suit against Eastern Shore's owner Shawn Esfahani and the "internet marketing expert" who first approached Eastern Shore with the microsite idea, David Vaughn, Jr. Bob Tyler Toyota brought six claims against Eastern Shore, seeking injunctive relief and actual and statutory damages, all relating to Eastern Shore's alleged misuse of its trademarks under state and federal law. The district court denied Bob Tyler Toyota's motion for summary judgment and its motion for judgment as a matter of law. The jury found that Eastern Shore violated at least one of Bob Tyler Toyota's six claims. At that time, Bob Tyler Toyota did not object to or even mention any inconsistencies between the jury's findings. A month after the verdict, Bob Tyler Toyota renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law on all of its claims. It also moved for a new trial on its anticybersquatting claim, arguing, among other things, that the jury verdict was inconsistent and that it was not supported by the evidence. The district court denied both motions. Bob Tyler Toyota appealed. In light of the totality of the evidence, the Eleventh Circuit could not say that the district court erred in denying Bob Tyler Toyota's motions or abused its discretion in determining the jury's verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision and jury verdict. View "Pensacola Motor Sales Inc. v. Eastern Shore Toyota" on Justia Law

This case arose from a trademark infringement suit involving the sale of counterfeit versions of defendant's hoisin sauce. The district court subsequently imposed sanctions in fees and costs pursuant to FRCP 11 against plaintiffs and their attorneys in favor of defendant. The attorneys appealed, contending that the district court erred in its application of Rule 11. Defendant cross-appealed, contending that the district should have awarded substantially more in fees and costs and moved to sanction the attorneys for filing a purportedly frivolous appeal. The court held that the safe harbor requirement under Rule 11 was satisfied in these circumstances; the attorneys have failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the action was frivolous; nor have the attorneys shown that the district court abused its discretion in deciding to impose monetary sanctions. The court rejected defendant's arguments on cross appeal and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Star Mark Mgmt., Inc. v. Koon Chun Hing Kee Soy & Sauce Factory, Ltd." on Justia Law

This case arose when the University told Daniel A. Moore, an artist who painted famous football scenes involving the University since 1979, that he would need permission to depict the University's uniforms because they were trademarks. Moore contended that he did not need permission because the uniforms were being used realistically to portray historic events. The parties could not reach a resolution and the University subsequently sued Moore for breach of contract, trademark infringement, and unfair competition. The court held that, as evidenced by the parties' course of conduct, Moore's depiction of the University's uniforms in his unlicensed paintings, prints, and calendars was not prohibited by the prior licensing agreements. Additionally, the paintings, prints, and calendars did not violate the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), because these artistically expressive objects were protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment by the district court with respect to the paintings and prints, and reversed with respect to the prints as replicated on calendars. With respect to the licensing agreements' coverage of the mugs and other "mundane products," the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment because disputed issues of fact remained. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "University of Ala. Bd of Trustees v. New Life, Inc" on Justia Law