Justia Trademark Opinion Summaries

The state notified a concert promoter that use of two names might violate New Jersey trademark laws. The promoter provided evidence of common law trademarks, but the state notified the hotel venue to advertise the shows as a "tribute" or "salute" to named groups. The promoter filed suit, claiming that the state's enforcement violated the federal Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125 and its civil rights. The district court entered a temporary restraining order, but the state changed its position. The court did not issue an injunction and denied attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments under the "catalyst" theory and holding that the promoter was not a "prevailing party." Even the judge did not consider the TRO an enforceable judgment on the merits and the state's change of position mooted the constitutional issues. View "Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc.v. Milgram" on Justia Law

The parties agree that defendant has used the mark continuously since 1998, Plaintiff claims, and defendant disputes, use since 1989. The defendant applied for registration of the mark in 1998 and the USPTO issued registration in 2002. The plaintiff applied for registration in 2000. The USPTO initially denied, but in 2008 granted, registration. The defendant sent a cease-and-desist letter in 2000, but plaintiff continued to use the mark. The parties negotiated and, in 2005, entered an agreement under which defendant would advertise on plaintiff's website. The relationship broke down and, in 2008 defendant petitioned the USPTO to cancel plaintiff's registration; the petition is still pending. Plaintiff sought declaratory judgment and defendant counterclaimed. The district court entered a preliminary injunction in favor of defendant. The First Circuit vacated and remanded. The district court erred in presuming irreparable harm upon finding a likelihood of success on the merits, in a case where there has been an excessive delay in seeking relief.

For many years the owners of the original bridal shop allowed family members to operate similar businesses under the same name. The owners sold one of their own shops and the buyer agreed to pay $75,000 per year for the use of the name and marks. When the agreement expired in 2002, the buyer continued to use the name and marks, without paying. The district court dismissed a 2007 claim under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1117, 1125. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the owners abandoned their mark by engaging in "naked licensing:" allowing others to use the mark without exercising reasonable control over the nature and quality of the goods, services, or business on which the mark is used. It was not enough that the owners had confidence in the high quality of the buyer's operation; they retained no control.

Appellant appealed an order of summary judgment in favor of the United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") in his eight Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. 552, requests for 19 C.F.R. 133.21(c) Notices of Seizures of Infringing Merchandise ("Notices") from certain United States ports. Appellant raised several issues of error on appeal. The court held that the district court's findings that the Notices contained plainly commercial information, which disclosed intimate aspects of an importers business such as supply chains and fluctuations of demand for merchandise, was well supported. The court also held that the district court was not clearly erroneous in its finding that the information at issue was confidential and privileged where the trade secret exemption of FOIA ("Exemption 4") was applicable. The court further held that when an agency freely disclosed to a third party confidential information covered by a FOIA exemption without limiting the third-party's ability to further disseminate the information then the agency waived the ability to claim an exemption to a FOIA request for the disclosed information. Therefore, the district court's ruling was affirmed in regards to FOIA Exemption 4 but the district court's conclusion as to the fees charged to appellant was reversed where CBP must follow the FOIA fee provisions under 19 C.F.R. 103.

A German online dating service, serving U.S. customers through a Delaware subsidiary, sued a New Jersey resident for operating an online dating service with a "confusingly similar" name, in violation of Illinois law, the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114(1), and federal common law. The district court entered default judgment and denied a motion to vacate. The Seventh Circuit reversed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Lanham Act does not create nationwide jurisdiction and, even discounting a finding that the defendant was not credible, the defendant did not have ties sufficient to establish jurisdiction in Illinois. Beyond operating a website accessible from the state, the defendant took no steps to target the Illinois market; the 20 Illinois residents who created profiles did so unilaterally, having "stumbled upon" the site.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants, Virtual City Vision, Inc. ("VSV") and Van James Bond Tran ("Tran"), alleging federal, state, and common law claims when defendants' newportnews.com domain name was confusingly similar to plaintiff's Newport News registered trademarks and its newport-news.com domain name. VCV raised numerous issues on appeal: the magistrate judge's failure to recuse; the court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over Tran, the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff on the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA") claim; the district court's denial of VCV's request to file a counterclaim; the district court's award of statutory damages and attorney's fees to plaintiff and sanctions against VCV's counsel; and the district court's finding that VCV was not the prevailing party for purposes of an award of attorneys' fees. The court held that the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that the circumstances would not cause a reasonable observer to question his impartiality, the district court found sufficient facts to pierce the corporate veil and exercise jurisdiction over Tran, and the district court's grant of summary judgment on the ACPA claim was proper. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying VCV's motion for leave to file a counterclaim. The court further held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that VCV's infringement was exceptional or abused its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees, that VCV's attempt to profit from plaintiff's mark by creating a website focused on women's fashion was sufficiently egregious to merit the statutory damages award, that the award of sanctions was not an abuse of discretion, and that plaintiff's abandonment claim did not make VCV a prevailing party.